

~~SECRET~~BARBARA J (LCI)

1,000-man Pack which included Classes II,
II, IV, and V

84,000 lbs.

BLAGAR (LCI)

1,000-man Pack which included Classes II,
III, IV, and V

84,000 lbs.

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SUPPLIES ON THE ORATAVA

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>INCLUDES</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>	<u>CU. FT.</u>
I		45,354	2,500
II & IV	2 - 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T. Trucks 6 - 19' Aluminum boats	48,816	5,104
III	860 drums auto gas 463 drums aviation gas 44 drums miscellaneous POL 10 drums White gas	556,289	15,436
V	SA HE WP Pyrotechnics and chemicals	41,257 481,176 95,387 4,681	708 12,165 2,409 199
	30 days Aviation Ordnance	<u>1,210,000</u> 2,482,960 1,242 S/Tons	<u>45,000</u> 83,521
	Gas on deck fwd and under deck aft		

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<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
II	General supplies; includes 6 aluminum boats and motors, 8 - $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks, 10 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck	707,533
III	FOL	73,885
IV	Communications and Medical equipment	42,273
V	Ammunition	<u>1,668,497</u>
		2,492,188 lbs
		1,246.1 S/Tons

The above included sufficient arms and equipment to equip 15,000 men.

An identical block of supplies for an additional 15,000 men was held at the Anniston Army Ordnance Depot, Anniston, Alabama, for subsequent shipment.

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YELLOW SUPPLY BLOCK

Available on call from Red River Arsenal and Midwest Depot.

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
I	Rations	94,860
II	General Supplies	1,351
III	POL	106,970
IV	Communications and medical equipment	12,629
V	Ammunitions	<u>999,299</u>
		1,215,109 lbs.
		607.55 S/Tons

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~~SECRET~~SUPPLIES AT GUATEMALA TRAINING BASE AND AIR BASE

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u> ——
	<u>AIR BASE</u>	
III	POL	160,000
IV	Aviation supplies	1,500
V	100-man Pack	7,500
		<u>169,000</u>
		84.5 S/Tons

TRAINING BASE

Sufficient rations, equipment and ammunition
for the equipping and training of 1,300 men.

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<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
I	Rations (11,000 bulk)	10,000
II & IV	General supplies, communications and medical equipment	150,000
V	Ammunition	785,000
Va	Aviation Ammunition	<u>185,000</u>
		1,130,000 lbs.
		565 S/Tons

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SUPPLIES AT PUERTO CABEZAS

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
	<u>GREEN-3 SUPPLY BLOCK</u>	
I	Rations - combat 20,000; "C" 17,840	53,250
II	General supplies	590
III	POL	35,467
IV	Communications and Medical	4,555
V	Ammunition	338,560
	1,000-man Pack	<u>80,000</u> 512,422 lbs. 256.21 S/Tons
	<u>AVIATION SUPPLIES</u>	
I	Rations	54,000
II	General supplies	130,000
IIIa	POL	1,800,000
IVa	Medical, communications, aviation spare parts, air/ground equipment	216,000
Va	Aviation Ordnance	<u>2,814,000</u> 5,014,000 lbs. 2,507 S/Tons
	Total at Puerto Cabezas	2,763.21 S/Tons

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AMMUNITION AVAILABLE TO THE BRIGADE
IN THE PARAMILITARY PACKS IN THE ASSAULT SHIPPING

	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u> <u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NUMBER ROUNDS</u> <u>IN FM PACKS</u>	<u>*DAYS FIRE</u> <u>PER WEAPON</u>
1.	M1 Rifles	485	323,952	44
2.	Carbines	150	—	
3.	SMG	470	239,000	20
4.	Pistols	465	40,000	43
5.	BAR	108	212,640	39
6.	30 LMG	36	204,000	47
7.	FL, 3.5	75	2,400	8
8.	57 RR	18	512	1
9.	75RR	3	—	
10.	81 Mortar	18	2,688	3
11.	4.2 Mortar	6	—	
12.	60 Mortar	36	3,200	2
13.	50 Cal MG	44	32,000	11
14.	30 MG	3	—	
15.	Flame Thrower	8	—	
16.	Tank, 76 gun	5	—	
17.	Hand Grenade	4 per man	22,000	8
18.	Demc kits	16 kits	220	—

*Paragraph 5.29 Estimated Expenditures of Ammunition, Assault of Hostile shore, Ft. 101-10, February 1959

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RATIONS

Troops were issued 3 days rations for landing.

57,410 Rations aboard ships in area.

21,000 Rations aboard back-up ships that did not reach the area.

39,040 Rations at Puerto Cabezas

11,000 Rations at Opalacka, Florida

3,000 Rations at Guat.

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4 May 1961

After Action Report On OPERATION PLUTO

1. Preparation:

On 28 March 1961 the LCI's ELAGAR and BARBARA J. departed Stock Island, Key West, Florida for Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, arriving on 2 April 1961.

captains _____ of the Elagar and _____ of the Barbara J., had been told that they were to lead and direct the landing phase of the coming invasion of Cuba which would be staged from Puerto Cabezas and all the details of the operation would be given us in Puerto Cabezas. Enroute we received a cable directing us upon arrival at Puerto Cabezas to assemble and test 36 small boats that were to be used in the coming operation. After arrival in Puerto Cabezas, the crews of the two ships carried out this mission completing it on 10 April. The briefing team from Washington arrived about 11 April and briefings were conducted on 12, 13, and 14 April. These briefings and the operations and administrative plans given us were clear and thorough. The Elagar was given the position of command ship and the mission of landing troops on both Blue and Green Beaches. The Barbara J. was to land troops on Red Beach and then patrol to the east to cover the landing areas.

2. Plan For Blue Beach:

The plan for Blue Beach called for landing two battalions, the ^{47th} ~~82nd~~

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aboard the Caribe and the 6th aboard the Rio Escondido, beginning at approximately 0100 hours 17 April in 4 LCVP's. Three LCU's preloaded with tanks, trucks and other vehicles were aboard a Navy LSD which would rendezvous with us five miles from Blue Beach and transfer the craft to us. They were to land on Blue Beach at first light. After the landing at Blue Beach was well underway, the Elagar was to come alongside the Atlantico and take aboard the ^{3rd} battalion and with one LCVP following proceed 16 miles east to Green Beach, put the battalion ashore and return to Blue Beach to act as Command Ship and direct the offloading of the cargo ships. Aboard each LCI was a thousand man pack of arms and ammunition plus some resupply of ammunition. This was to be on call for the brigade ashore. The landing at Green Beach was to be conducted as soon as we felt we could leave Blue Beach, but was not expected to be done until after daylight of the 17th.

The reconnaissance of the beach itself and the marking of the landing sites was to be conducted by the UDT, teams that had been especially trained for this job for the last four months. There were three of these teams: one three-man team in the Barbara J for Red Beach, one five-man team for Blue Beach, and one three-man team for Green Beach were aboard the Elagar. They were to land as soon as the LCI's arrived in the landing areas and while the LCVP's and small boats were loading the troops. It was felt that they would have about one hour to perform their missions.

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3. Plan For Red Beach:

The LCI Barbara J. was escort for the cargo ship Houston which held the 2nd and 5th battalions into the Bay of Cochinos and land them at the head of the bay on Red Beach. This was to be done utilizing the small boats (12) of the Houston. It was planned to load each boat with ten men and their equipment. After this landing was completed the Barbara J. was to escort the Houston back to Blue Beach where its cargo was to be off loaded by the LCU's. The Barbara J. was then to patrol for ten miles to the east of Green Beach.

In all this planning we were told that early morning air strikes on the air bases in Cuba were planned and that these would take out all of Castro's air force.

4. Movement To The Beach Areas:

The Rio Escondido had damaged her props on logs coming out of New Orleans enroute to Puerto Cabezas and could only do five knots so this ship was loaded first and left Puerto Cabezas on 12 April. All the other ships left on the night of 14 April and proceeded independently to an assembly area at point AA. The brigade commander and staff were aboard the Blagar. All ships arrived on station at 1730 hours 16 April and formed a column for the run into the beaches. The column was led by the Blagar and followed at 800 yard intervals by the Caribe, Atlantico, Barbara J., Houston and the Rio Escondido. At five miles from Blue Beach the LSD rendezvoused with the column and the transfer of the landing craft began. At this point the Barbara J. and the Houston left the column and proceeded toward Red Beach. The Blagar moved on up to within two miles of Blue Beach to launch the UDT teams. This five-man team and departed the Blagar at 2345 hours 16 April in a seven-man, Navy rubber

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UDT boat with a 16 HP silent motor. Two men were armed with BAR's and the other four with Thompson sub-machine guns. The team was equipped with a PRC-10 radio and lighting sets for beach and buoys for marking the channels. Escorting them part of the way was a 20 foot catamaran boat from the Blagar. This boat also had a PRC-10 radio and mounted one .50 and one .30 caliber machine gun. This boat was to lie off the beach and provide cover for the UDT teams.

5. Landing At Blue Beach:

The town of Playa Giron was well lighted and a cluster of very bright lights on the right of the town proved to be from the small group of buildings at the jetty which marked the right boundary of the landing area. At about 1000 yards out, six men were observed outside these buildings looking seaward. As there were no lights or noise from the ships it was assumed that they were merely coast watchers which later checking proved to be correct. The UDT team started into the beach about 300 yards west of these buildings and at when 500 yards out, all the lights in the buildings were switched off. The UDT team discovered a coral ridge about 100 yards from the beach running across the front of the landing area and one foot below the surface. They crossed this and started the boat into the beach. Fifty yards from shore a jeep came from the town down the beach road, and headed east and picked them up in its headlights. This jeep stopped directly in front of the team and turned toward the water throwing its headlights on the boat. It then caught the full fire of two BAR's and four Thompsons and was

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knocked out instantly. The team moved on to the beach and called the Blagar on the radio and told them what had happened. They also called for an immediate landing of troops on the beach before the enemy could rush in its troops. The team placed a red light by the jeep, moved toward the jetty 150 yards to the east and placed the other one; then moved out onto the jetty and placed the large white light to guide the landing craft in. While this was taking place someone pulled the master switch and blacked out Playa Giron completely. Three trucks were then observed moving toward the beach area without lights. These trucks discharged some troops who moved in on the UDT team who were in position in some old ruins on the jetty. The Blagar then moved in near the jetty to lend fire support to the landing. The Blagar was armed with eleven .50 caliber machine guns, five .30 caliber machine guns and two .75 MM RR. The militia was fired upon by the UDT team when they attempted to remove the red marker lights off the beach. This fire fight was in progress when the Blagar opened fire on the beach from a distance of 400 yards, clearing it completely in a few minutes. The only return fire was from one .50 caliber machine gun firing from the direction of the town. This fire wounded one man on the Blagar and then ceased fire. After about ten minutes of firing on the beach area, the Blagar moved back and the first two LCVP's came in. They struck the coral about 75 yards from the beach and tried to ride over it but could not. They then dropped their ramps and the troops waded ashore. The first troops came ashore yelling but once on the beach moved out quickly and quietly. The UDT team called the second two LCVP's to land and warned them about the coral and had them come in slower and to discharge their troops

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as soon as they grounded on the coral. The brigade commander and his staff landed in a boat from Blagar at this time and took command of the beach. His radio was not working so his messages were relayed over the radio of the UDT team. There was no opposition to this landing as the fire from the Blagar had driven the militia away and no firing was heard until the troops started moving through the town. [] then returned to the Blagar to direct the rest of the landing, and to prepare to go to Green Beach. The five men of the UDT team were left on the beach to find a landing site for the LCU's. They had the PRC-10 radio and the boat and motor. The landing of troops continued and by first light all the troops of the 4th battalion were ashore and the 6th battalion was starting its troops ashore using the small boats from the Rio Escondido. Two of the LCVP's were holed by coral and after making several trips ashore one was forced to beach itself and the other sunk but the crew was picked up and sent to the beach. The UDT team continued to search for a landing site for the LCU's with no luck until a local fisherman was found who showed them a passage through the coral that could be used at high tide about 0630. This was a narrow channel and could only be used by one LCU at a time. The channel was marked by buoys and at 0600 hours the first LCU landed. After this LCU was off loaded, it backed out and another moved into the channel. The empty one was sent to the Rio Escondido to complete the offloading of the 6th battalion. As this was taking place Red Beach called and reported they were under air attack by a B-26. About ten minutes later or at 0630 the first enemy aircraft appeared at Blue Beach. It was a B-26 which came from the east and strafed the LCU's landing on the beach causing some damage to the motor of one LCVP which proceeded into the beach under its own power. There were no casualties from this attack and

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all anti-aircraft guns were firing on the plane. It left to the west in the direction of Red Beach. As this plane was leaving two more planes were sighted coming from the west and fire was put on them before it was discovered they were a friendly B-26 escorting a C-46 for the parachute drop. When they were recognized as friendly the fire ceased. No apparent damage was done to the planes but we were told later that one paratrooper was wounded but jumped anyway. The blue wing bands that were to identify our planes could not be seen until the planes were overhead and proved to be of little value in telling friend from foe. The enemy air attacks, although practically continuous, were never in groups of over two planes each. Each plane attacked independently and when he had fired his rockets left immediately. The only types observed were B-26's, which strafed and fired rockets, Sea Fury's which usually only fired rockets (four) and T-33 jets which fired rockets also. The B-26's and Sea Fury's were usually brought under AA fire with some effect but the T-33's always came from high out of the sun and we were never able to bring effective fire on them. After the first air attacks I called the brigade commander on the radio and advised him against moving the Elagor east to make the landing at Green Beach. The reasons given were that the departure of the Elagor would leave the ships in the beach area without their most effective anti-aircraft fire. Also by this time we had lost 3 of the 4 LCVP's and if the enemy planes hit us on our way down to Green Beach (a 2 hour trip), it might result in the loss of the battalion plus the command ship. I told him I could put the battalion ashore right away on Blue Beach by using the LCU's, and he could then start them toward Green Beach on the road. He agreed

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to this and two of the LCU's took this battalion ashore on Blue Beach.

At about 0700 our own B-26's were on station over the landing area and we thought the air attacks were finished but at 0800 a Sea Fury came in and dove on one of our C-46's that was returning from dropping the paratroopers. He came through our AA fire and made a firing pass on the C-46 which had dropped down next to the water and was staying within the harbor area. The Sea Fury was caught by our fire as he pulled up from his firing pass and started smoking and crashed into the water, exploded and sank. This cheered up the AA crews and other attacks later on were met with all guns that could fire. At about this time we received a message from the Barbara J. that the Houston was hit and sinking and that they would beach her. The Barbara J. was damaged by near misses by rockets that had split her seams and she was taking in water. She started out of the Bay of Cochinos to Blue Beach. At this time a Sea Fury came through our fire and fired four rockets at the Rio Escondido one of which exploded the drums of aviation gasoline on her decks. An LCU was at this time enroute to the Rio to take off this gasoline and her other cargo. The fire soon spread and it was apparent that the ship was lost. The crew started jumping over the sides and swimming away from the ship. All the small boats in the beach area headed for the Rio and soon picked up all of her crew. These boats were about 1000 yards away from her taking the crew to other ships when she blew up and sank. The depth of the water at this point is 600 fathoms. The crew of the Rio was put aboard the Blagar and the gun and boat crews of the Rio were sent to the beach. A message was sent to Headquarters advising them of the loss of the two ships and an answer was

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received directing us to take all the rest of the ships to sea and return and unload under the cover of darkness. At this time we were attacked by a B-26 and the fire from the ships and from a friendly B-26 sent him away smoking. The Barbara J. and the two cargo ships the Caribe and the Atlantico were told to proceed ahead of us and wait 15 miles out. At this time I called the UDT team of 5 men ashore on Blue Beach and told them to return to the ship as we were going out to sea and return that night. They replied that they would stay on the beach and light it for us when we returned that night. All these men were captured when Blue Beach fell. The Blagar was to escort the three LCU's which could only do six knots. Two friendly B-26's flew cover for us on the way out although the wing tank of one was loose on the front end and was hanging down. These planes stayed with us until their reserve gas supply was gone and then one of them asked permission to drop his bombs on the Cienfuegos Airport on the way home. This permission was given and he departed.

Results unknown. When we reached the 15 mile point we called the other ships and told them to assemble on us but only the Barbara J. showed up. The two cargo ships could not be found nor would they answer the radio calls. Soon after the Barbara J. rejoined us we were attacked by a B-26 and a Sea Fury coming from the beach area. The B-26 started an approach on the Blagar but was hit and as the plane fired its rockets it exploded in flames. The rockets struck 50 yards from the Blagar and the plane hit the water in the same place and bounced over the ship clearing the deck by only 20 feet. It struck the water about 100 yards over the ship and burned and sank. Parts of the plane

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were scattered over the deck of the Blagar. The Sea Fury did not press his attack but made one short strafing pass at the Barbara J. hitting her with two or three .20 MM shells. He then threw four rockets at the LCU's from a high altitude all of which missed and he departed. Two more attacks were made on us later in the day by lone B-26's none of which pressed the attack. The AA fire held them at a distance and they fired their rockets wide of the targets.

After dark of D-Day we continued south hoping to make some contact with the cargo ships but to no avail. Sometime during the night a message was received directing the Barbara J. to unload her ammunition and a 500-man pack into one of the LCU's for a run into the beach that night. It was felt that the Blagar should go because of the damage the Barbara J. had sustained; however, upon charting the course we found that due to the slow speed of the LCU, we could not arrive until after daylight of D plus 1. Headquarters was notified of this and we were told not to go. While the planning for the run into the beach was underway, some of the crew of the Rio that we had rescued went into the engine room and stopped the engines. They said they would not go back into the beach area without jet air cover. They were subdued and the engines were started again. Some of the Cuban crew of the Blagar were in sympathy with them and there were some rumors of mutiny. The day of D plus 1 was spent looking for the cargo ships which joined us late in the evening. We had orders to off load all their cargo plus the ammunition from the two LCI's into the LCU's and run it into the beach that night. We were told we must be in, unload and be off the beach by daylight. The LCU's were loaded

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and we started into the beach but again we notified Headquarters that we could not arrive until after first light. We were told not to go in but to stay where we were. All this time we were the only radio link with the brigade on the beach and they were sending out a steady stream of messages from the beach. Most of them were asking for air cover and air drops of ammunition. We relayed to brigade all the messages from Headquarters and from the air base. We were told that several air drops were to be made on the night of D plus 1 on the air field and the brigade was notified and marked the strip. The first air drop on the field was made but most of the chutes drifted off the strip into the woods. (These were recovered the next morning.) The brigade then requested that the drops be made on the town itself and the two later drops that night went there; one of them was right on target and the supplies landed in the streets and were quickly recovered but the last one was too close to the water and most of the chutes drifted into the sea.

Some of these were recovered by small boats later on. We were also told that a C-46 escorted by two F-51's would arrive that night and land at the strip but they never appeared. One message also said that C-46's would land on the strip and discharge supplies and take off the wounded. The brigade was told to move its wounded (about 50 at this time) to the strip and they said they would. Later talks with survivors revealed that the brigade surgeon would not move the wounded to the strip for fear of losing them by air attacks. One C-46 did land at the strip at first light, discharged its cargo and departed taking one wounded man that the brigade commander had sent out with

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the situation report on the beach. This plane load was the last supplies ever to reach the beach. During the morning of D plus 2 the brigade kept reporting very heavy air, tank and artillery attacks from both north and east and asked continually for jet cover. These messages were sent back and we were told jet cover would be provided by unmarked jets and the brigade reported seeing them arrive over the beach area. We were not told that this was for one hour only. Later the brigade reported they were under air attack again and asked where the jet cover had gone. I could not answer this because we thought it would be continuous. The brigade also asked for close air support and sent back locations of troop concentrations and tank and artillery positions on the roads to the north. At this time the brigade was still in contact with the paratroopers to the north and was reporting them as being under heavy artillery fire and fire by tanks. The brigade reported three MIGS were over Blue Beach but it is possible they saw the unmarked jets and mistook them for MIG's. At 0500 on D plus 2 the brigade commander said that unless he got ammunition right away that he could not hold. I told him help was on the way and we would evacuate him. His reply was that he would never evacuate and that he would fight as long as he had ammunition. At about noon on D plus 2 the Blagar, the Barbara J. and the three LCU's loaded with supplies started for the beach. Our ETA was about 1800 hours. At 1300 I was told by the Navy and relayed to the brigade that close jet air support was coming. It never appeared. At 1430 the brigade commander told me that he was out of contact with all units, out of

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ammunition, fighting in the water and under direct fire from tanks 500 yards away. He said he was destroying his equipment and heading for the woods. He then went off the air. At this time Headquarters was notified and the convoy reversed course as there was no need now for going in. One hour later a friendly PHV came from the direction of Blue Beach and passed us going S.W.

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A. Action At Red Beach:

The UDT team from the Barbara J. led by _____ landed at _____ about 0130 and placed the marker light on the right side of the beach but was fired on from shore when attempting to place the left marker. This fire was from small automatic weapons and was silenced by the fire of the UDT team firing BAR's and submachine guns from the rubber boat. The first troops of the 2nd battalion started ashore in the small (19½ foot) boats of the Houston and the UDT team marked the left of the beach with a flashlight from 100 yards out in the rubber boat. The second wave received fire from shore while on

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the way in. This fire was silenced by the Barbara J. firing over the heads of the landing force. The militia fled leaving some of their weapons behind. Once ashore the troops moved through the town and cleaned it out.

The landings continued until all the 2nd battalion minus one squad was ashore and the weapons company of the 5th battalion landed also. (For more details on this period see report by [] on Red Beach.) One survivor, the Company Commander of the weapons company of the 2nd battalion stated that soon after daylight the beach was secured and they had captured over 40 prisoners. They discovered that 12 militia had been stationed in the town to guard a small militia radio station but that 30 or 40 had come in the day before on a picnic and were spending the night there. After the town was secured and the radio station was captured, the force which was under the command of the Brigade Deputy Commander sent a group out and captured a motor pool of trucks and gasoline at a motel and park construction project west of town. He also stated that 40 men from this small village

offered to join them and fight against Castro. These men were put to work driving the captured trucks and other labor jobs on the beach. They were in complete control of the town and were not hurt by the air attacks which were directed against the town itself. These attacks and later ones caused many civilian casualties. The first attack by the militia came at 1000 on D-day and was from the north. This force was estimated at between 500 and 600 militia and had some tanks but friendly airplanes knocked out the tanks before they could go into action. This attack was beaten off with very heavy

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casualties suffered by the militia. As they were running short of ammunition a call for help was sent to Blue Beach and one tank and two 2½ ton trucks of ammunition was sent to them along the beach road. This arrived at 1400 just as the next big attack was about to hit them and the tank went into action as soon as it arrived. This attack was launched down the road from the north. The troops, all militia, were in open, 2½ ton trucks and open, semi-trailer trucks. The fire of the tank and the 57 MM R.R's, 3.5's and the 50 caliber machine guns of the landing force hit them before they could get out of the trucks. This force was estimated at 1500 and all the survivors of this action claimed they killed or wounded over half of them and destroyed most of the trucks. The next attack came late in the evening and continued all night. During the night action at least five enemy tanks were knocked out, two Russian ones and three American Sherman tanks. These were destroyed by 57 MM R.R. and 3.5's. How many were knocked out by the tank is unknown. The militia at one time sent an ambulance under a white flag to pick up wounded but tried to sneak two trucks loaded with militia in behind it. The tank destroyed all three vehicles with one round and the machine guns finished the job. At another time some militia that were trapped in some buildings came out to surrender but when the CEF troops moved toward them they dropped to the ground and opened fire. All this group was then wiped out by the CEF troops. The survivors stated that all the troops opposing them were militia and all prisoners had the Communist party card on their persons. When asked about these cards they stated that if they

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they had no cards they could not get work. Most of the militia stated also that they were willing to fight against Castro. At about 0730 on D plus 1 the force at Red Beach was low on ammunition and was withdrawn to Blue Beach in the captured trucks, their own trucks and the tank. They took their wounded with them but released all their prisoners upon departure. They destroyed the radio station and all the trucks that they could not use. Upon arrival at Blue Beach they held a muster to account for everyone. Blue Beach at this time on D plus 1 was quiet and the survivors stated that they had lunch and slept, cleaned up and were issued ammunition. That afternoon they went into action at Blue Beach, fought all night and at about 1100 the next morning 90 men of the 2nd battalion under the command of the Deputy Brigade Commander / was sent back to Red Beach to stop a large column of militia, tanks and artillery that was massing there. This force it is believed never reached Red Beach but it is known that they went into action because they called for mortar fire and the 2nd battalion mortars fired 120 rounds for them and then was out of ammunition. Two tanks went out with this group and was seen coming back to Blue Beach about 1300 damaged and out of ammunition. Nothing more was heard of this group and soon after the enemy force came down the road from Red Beach and attacked it from the west. This force was very large and had heavy artillery (larger than 4.2) and tanks. One survivor stated that at 1400 he went to Brigade Headquarters which was by the beach for ammunition and the Brigade Commander and staff were there but when he made a second trip at 1530 the Brigade Headquarters was gone and also a sailboat that was tied

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up near it. He states that starting at 1600 the front lines collapsed due to the lack of ammunition and at about 1700 all resistance ceased. He left Blue Beach with four companions in a row boat and saw many other small boats leaving at the same time. The enemy planes strafed these boats and caused many casualties. His boat drifted all night and at dawn they found themselves on the beach on the west side of the Bay of Cochinos. They then made their way down the keys to the point to where they were rescued by the UDT teams. One survivor stated that his company was hit in Blue Beach on the night of D plus 1 by a shell fired from a tank that emitted some smoke and threw droplets on their clothing. The droplets did not burn, but the smoke did and caused choking and pain. They ran out of the area and when they returned later they found several dead from this shell, but he claims there were no wounds and the men died from what he thinks was a gas shell. He also stated that the next morning several men told him of the same thing occurring in their sectors, also by tank fire. Detailed action on Blue Beach is unknown due to lack of any survivors who landed there in the original force.

B. Sinking of Houston:

The Houston was hit sometime after first light by rockets while still at Red Beach. These rockets started fires in the number one and number three holds and the Houston pulled out from the beach. The fires were put out by the crew and the ship turned and started back in. At this time she was hit the second time by two rockets fired from a T-33 jet. These

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struck the stern somewhere around the screws knocking out the steering. The ship was crosswise in the bay and could only go forward or backward. She attempted to back up but started sinking by the stern so the Captain ran her up on the beach on the west side of the bay. This was about five miles south of Red Beach. The planes came back again so the order was given to abandon ship. Aboard at this time was one squad of the 2nd Battalion and most of the 5th Battalion plus a 20-man ship's crew, approximately 220 men. Six men were killed by the air attack and seven more drowned swimming to shore. Small boats were used plus lines to the shore to get the men off. After everyone was ashore the C.O. of the 5th Battalion took command and organized a perimeter. He then sent men back aboard to try to salvage what arms and equipment they could. Some was gotten off but as the holds were filled with water, this was not easy. He then sent scouts out in the direction of Red Beach, but they returned and told of running into militia between them and Red Beach. This beach perimeter was held until D plus 2. Some food and water was gotten off the Houston but not nearly enough. On D plus 2 a patrol craft about 35 feet long and mounting one machine gun came from the east and pulled up the Houston. It is believed that this was the Castro craft SV-3. The boat checked the Houston and then came in to the beach to check the three small boats drawn up on shore. When it reached the beach, the troops ashore fired on it and killed four of its six-man crew. Two were captured. The Captain of the Houston then took this craft together with the C.O. of the 5th Battalion, the padre, two or three of the doctors and five other officers of

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the 5th Battalion out to the Houston and put aboard all the gasoline and supplies they could find. The Battalion C.O. then gave the order for the beachhead to break up in small groups and try to get out to the south. Some groups went to the north, some went inland but most started down the Coast to the south. The Battalion C.O. then left to the south in the captured boat and said he was headed for Grand Cayman. Out of the groups who started south down the beach 21 were later rescued, including some of the crew of the Houston.

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4 MAY 1961

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REPORT OF ACTIVITIES ON BARBARA J

The writer was Operations Officer on the Barbara J. The Barbara J is a LCI fitted with eight .50 cal machine guns, three .30 machine guns, a 5mm recoilless rifle, and a 57mm recoilless rifle, plus various automatic and carried weapons. The job for the Barbara J during the operation was as follows:

1. The Barbara J was to escort the transport ship Houston into Bahia Cochinos to Red Beach. The Houston had aboard the 2nd and 5th Battalions Reinforced.
2. The Barbara J was to spot the Houston offshore, while the Barbara J's beach reconnaissance team reconnoitered the beach and set light markers at each flank of a suitable landing site.
3. The Barbara J was to provide gunfire support when necessary and assist in the unloading of the Houston's men and supplies at Red Beach.
4. When the beach was considered in good shape, the Barbara J was to escort the Houston out of Bahia Cochinos and proceed to patrol the beach from Green Beach eastward for five miles, engaging any enemy sea or road convoys heading toward Green Beach.
5. The Barbara J was to engage in any harassment operations which would confuse the enemy and help our own forces.

The objective of the 2nd Battalion on Red Beach was to secure the beachhead, proceed northward to Sopillar airstrip, link up with the paratroopers, and proceed to Objective A on the railroad at 82.0 - 72.0 on the 1:50,000 map. The objective of the 5th Battalion was to land behind the 2nd Battalion and take over and safeguard the beachhead.

At 2330 on D-1 the Barbara J and the Houston separated from the major convoy on schedule. At 0115 on D-Day the Barbara J and the Houston were on station opposite Red Beach. One Barbara J small boat with radio was dispatched to stand by with the Houston. The other small boat with the reconnaissance team and the writer proceeded ashore to the right of Red Beach and scouted and marked the right flank without being detected. Then the team proceeded by water to the point which was to be the left flank of Red Beach and discovered the point was occupied by enemy men. The 2nd Battalion commander was asked to notify us when he was within ten minutes of dispatching his first wave to the Beach. When the Battalion commander signified he was ready, the recon team approached the point. At about 30 yards off the point four or five machine guns and sub-machine guns opened fire on the recon boat. The recon boat returned fire and silenced these guns. The recon boat backed up to approximately 100 yards off the point and marked the left flank with a blinking flashlight towards sea. The first forty soldiers landed without opposition, though sporadic fire started as soon as they had landed ashore. This fire was their initial contact with the 50 militiamen in the village at the time of the landing.

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Within twenty minutes of the reconnaissance team's initial contact with the enemy, six or seven trucks were seen entering the area from the left flank. The writer called for supporting fire from the Barbara J. The Barbara J's first shots hit the lead truck and threw the convoy into darkness and confusion and apparently helped delay the convoy's arrival at Red Beach until later in the morning.

The reconnaissance group proceeded then to help in landing the troops. These troops were landed with approximately two units of fire and a minimum of equipment other than their personal weapons and the unit weapons. The unit weapons we succeeded in getting ashore were four .30 cal light machine guns, four 81mm mortars, and four 57mm recoilless rifles, plus 3.5 rocket launchers. On the second trip to Red Beach, our boat was hit by machine gun fire coming from about 200 yards left of the Red Beach left flank. One man in the boat was killed. On arrival at the beach this second trip, the writer sent for a representative of the 2nd Battalion command post, and between the two, an airstrike plan was set up in the event that communication might be out when the daylight airstrike arrived. In the plan, the aircraft would take on any targets moving along the beach towards Red Beach or along the road from the north towards Red Beach, and at first daylight the 2nd Battalion commander would send a well-briefed officer to the beach carrying a red flag for further conference with the writer. The commanding officer at this conference requested that future landing craft be landed nearer the right flank of the beach in as much as all enemy activity to date was being encountered from the left. There were explosions within the beachhead at this time which the writer took to be incoming mortar fire with some light calibre.

During this period, some .50 cal machinegun fire was directed at the Barbara J. The Barbara J was lying about 500 yards offshore and the Barbara J engaged this machine gun and silenced it.

The Houston reported that there were no small boats, so our recon team tied onto one of the Barbara J's rubber boats to the lee side of the Houston where we found seven or eight small aluminum boats huddled with no troop movement going on. The writer climbed aboard and got a boat-load and a half of soldiers off-loaded before being stopped by a Cuban believed to be the 5th Battalion Commander. The writer believes that this man's intention was to wait until first daylight before continuing off-loading the 5th Battalion. At this point, 270 soldiers had been off-loaded. This was the 2nd Battalion Reinforced and the weapons company from the 5th Battalion and the Assistant Brigade Commander.

On the trip into shore, first daylight had arrived and at approximately 6 o'clock a P-26 appeared low and machine-gunned our small boat without success on this first run. When he came again we turned our

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small weapons and the weapons of all the soldiers in the small boat and fired back at him. On this pass the B-26 wounded one soldier with a freak shot that passed through another man's weapon before hitting the soldier. On the third pass of the B-26, he immediately, after passing overhead, started smoking and wobbling and soon went down over land with one survivor parachuting out.

A second B-26 appeared and started after the Barbara J and Houston. He strafed and dropped two large bombs, both misses. The Barbara J's skipper was circling the Houston tightly and bringing all her firepower in support of the Houston during this action.

At this point, our cargo planes bearing paratroopers and accompanied by two friendly B-26's arrived in the area and the enemy aircraft departed. At the departure of our aircraft, we were attacked by a fighter plane which I believe was a Sea Fury. The skipper of the Barbara J decided to disperse until our air cover had better control and so moved the Barbara J and the Houston away from Red Beach about five miles.

The writer suggests that the following is a likely account of the short history of Red Beach. The account is compiled from observation and interrogation of survivors. Very little action occurred at Red Beach before daylight. Most of the shooting was our own. The air attack at daybreak, which included bombing and strafing the beachhead, damaged nothing important. At approximately 1000 a truck-mounted attack from the north involving 500 or 600 militia was broken up by Red Beach forces. This was accomplished with small losses to our forces and considerable loss to the militia. Fifty to seventy of the militia were captured, most of which were willing to join the Red Beach forces. The paratroopers were apparently engaged immediately upon landing, and link between the paratroopers and Red Beach forces was not accomplished. At 1400 on D-Day, another attack was made from the north involving 1,500 militia. An unknown amount were destroyed en route to this battle by a friendly B-26. Two of our own tanks which had been sent up from Blue Beach assisted in stopping this attack. From all accounts, this force was well handled by our forces, and we claimed 1,000 casualties were inflicted. Seven tanks, which arrived after midnight were engaged by our 57mm recoilless rifles and 3.5 rockets, and five were destroyed. On D+1 an orderly withdrawal to Blue Beach was affected, since Red Beach was out of ammunition. Red Beach losses at this time were 25 dead, and an unknown amount wounded. The wounded were carried to Blue Beach.

On arrival at Blue Beach, the 2nd Battalion was put into the Blue Beach defense line which had been comparatively quiet till this point. In the afternoon, a battle started which put 1,500 militiamen against the 2nd Battalion. This battle lasted all night. The following morning an attempt was made to regain Red Beach, but the 2nd Battalion encountered

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tanks, trucks, troops, and artillery, and it is believed, did not reach Red Beach. The heavy mortars supported the 2nd Battalion until out of ammunition. Two tanks which were supporting the 2nd Battalion were returned to Blue Beach damaged by this action. It is believed that the 2nd Battalion was lost with Blue Beach.

At the time when the skipper of the Barbara J ordered the dispersal of the convoy, a B-26 arrived requesting targets for his bombs at Red Beach. He was instructed to go to Objective A on the north road and engage any mobile forces moving towards Red Beach. He located a convoy moving into Red Beach with Blue marked trucks and was refrained from interfering with this convoy since it was known to be ours.

At this point the skipper of the Barbara J turned the convoy back towards Red Beach. The Barbara J and the Houston arrived off the point Carazones. When a T-33 jet arrived and strafed and fired rockets, with near misses for the Barbara J and hits on the Houston, a welded seam on the Barbara J was split, causing the Barbara J to take water at the rate of four feet each two and a half hours. The Houston announced the loss of their steering capability, and was at this time headed towards the beach. The skipper of the Barbara J ordered the Houston to reverse engines and back away from the beach. The Houston attempted to do this, but was observed to begin sinking rapidly by the stern. At the same time another Sea Fury started attacking the Houston. Gasoline was covering the water all around both ships, and the Houston reversed its engines again and made straight into the shore, grounding about 100 yards off-shore. As she struck shore, men were seen diving over the side in life jackets. The Sea Fury continued its strafing runs against the ship and the men in the water. From subsequent reports, we believe from seven to twenty men were killed in the strafing, and ten drowned from inability to swim. The Barbara J had no small boats; the Houston didn't attempt to use its three small boats. There was speculation as to whether we should attempt an evacuation, but this was tempered by the idea that the occupants of the Houston were scheduled to go ashore with the possibility that they could make a tie-up at Red Beach. The Barbara J was ordered to move to the Blue beach to provide protection for the unloading operations there, the ships at Blue Beach being under air attack also.

From interrogation of survivors, it is learned that the Houston group proceeded towards Red Beach, but the scouts observed militiamen, and the entire group withdrew to the swamp. My last radio contact with this group was an announcement by the 5th Battalion Commander that he had successfully regrouped 1 1/2 miles west of the sunken ship. Information on his position was requested for an intended air supply drop. Within a half hour he was under attack. His request was for small boats so that he could strip the Houston of necessary supplies. Arrangements were made for PB-12 rubber boats and paddles to be dropped at first darkness. Within a half hour after this arrangement, the Houston was under attack and apparently the enemy was trying to split it up. I feel that our voice of communication was being monitored. The

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following night an enemy patrol craft approached the Houston and landed five militiamen. These five were attacked by the survivors of the Houston. Two militiamen were killed and three taken prisoners. The three prisoners were executed because of the logistical problems they made for the survivors. On the 19th the skipper of the Houston, the 5th Battalion Commander, five 5th Battalion officers, the Chaplain, and three doctors left the beach in the captured patrol craft, bidding their men to scatter and make out for themselves. This might indicate a reason why the 5th Battalion seemed reluctant to go ashore at Red Beach. Of the remaining men, a few immediately made their way north through the swamps, and a few made their way south. Those that were rescued on the southern islands has swum most of the way in the swamps. The Houston skipper and the small boat reportedly departed for Cayo Guano, but radio Cuba reported it landed at Cayo Largo and the men were captured.

As the Barbara J departed from Bahia Cochinos, a Sea Fury was circling, but apparently was bluffed by two or our B-26's which were flying protection for Barbara J. A jet T-33 was seen to attack one of the B-26's, and the B-26 was seen to fly lower and to either crash or make a crash landing on the airstrip at Blue Beach area. The remaining B-26 hovered over the Barbara J, reported he was out of ammunition, and asked for instructions. I requested that he stay as long as possible to bluff enemy aircraft, which he did, until he had only fifteen minutes reserve gasoline supply. This man's name was and should be commended for courageous work.

At the entrance of Bahia Cochinos we had observed the Rio Escondido catch fire and blow up.

On arrival in the Blue Beach area, all ships were ordered south. We departed with the Atlantico and Caribe leading, and the Barbara J providing close support. The U-boats protected by the Blagar followed. The Blagar requested all ships to merge for mutual self-protection. The Barbara J joined the Blagar and U-boats, and the Caribe and Atlantico disappeared over the horizon. One strafing and bombing pass was made on the right flank LCU, with the Blagar and Barbara J giving her support. What appeared to be a salvo boat of shore-based artillery splashed five shells within the convoy on the way out. This was possibly 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock in the afternoon of D-Day.

At approximately 3:30, when the convoy was outside the continental limit, a sea fury and a B-26 attacked. The Sea Fury circled high and the B-26 came for a low strafing attack, lining up the Barbara J and the Blagar. As the B-26 passed over the Blagar, it exploded in a great ball of flame. It is believed that hits from Blagar guns had entered the gas tanks, and that the pilot fired his rockets, causing the explosion. The Sea Fury then circled for a few minutes and started.

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a run on the Barbara J, but peeled off early, probably because of the Barbara J's gunfire. He scored 20mm hits on the Barbara J. At this time we were ordered further out to sea.

Preparations were made for a night run into Blue Beach. When the order arrived, headquarters was notified that we were without the cargo ships, and that it was felt that it was impossible to arrive at Blue Beach before daylight. Air and/or sea support was requested, with the warning that we felt we were sure to be sunk without this protection and thus be no good to Blue Beach. During the night we were ordered to cancel this run. The following evening the cargo ships had been reassembled, and the Caribe was unloaded into LCUs. The Barbara J was unloaded into an LCU when the order came for the Barbara J to make an 500-man pack supply run to Blue Beach. The Barbara J was leaking and one bank of engines was out and emptied of supplies and had no small boats, so the responsibility was shifted to the Blagar. The writer transferred to the Blagar to assist in this run and to assist the Blagar Operations Officer with communications functions. At approximately midnight the run was started, with an additional warning to headquarters that we were going to arrive in daylight. An air or sea support was necessary. Sometime during the night this trip was cancelled.

The writer relieved the Operations Officer of the Blagar in communication duties at times during the night. The gist of the communication can be summed up as follows: The Brigade commander continually reported he was out of anti-tank ammunition and surgical supplies and had wounded to evacuate. All messages were forwarded to strike base and U. S. Navy. From strike base and U. S. Navy we continually received assurances that re-supplies and evacuation of wounded were being carried on and that a close air support strike was arranged for first light. A tank column had been located coming into Blue Beach from the north. Its exact location was reported by the Brigade Commander. Arrangements were made for strike base to take on these tanks at first light, and U. S. Navy jets were "on the way." The jets had not appeared when first light arrived and their whereabouts was requested. We were told that they were still "on the way."

At 20 minutes daylight a request from headquarters came that () go on beach to evaluate the situation. A Cuban CW operator was recruited to go with () No boat operator was found who would go. Subsequent activity negated this operation.

At daylight the beach was under air, tank, and artillery attack. During the night, two re-supply drops had been made, part of which went into the ocean, part of which was received. A C-46 had landed on the airstrip, dumped its supplies, and departed evacuating one wounded.

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The Brigade commander began talking in terms of his men standing in the water fighting, and "being massacred" and "murdered". At one point he could see four Navy jets high overhead, and was being attacked simultaneously by three enemy Sea Fury's. When he asked that the jets enter the fight and was told that we were doing everything to get permission, his comment was "God damn it, God damn you, God dam you. Do not wait for permission". He continually spotted tanks, artillery locations, and continually asked when would they be attacked by our airplanes. About midday the base announced that we were going in in full force, shooting, for evacuation purposes. The Brigade commander was told that within three hours the Navy forces, air and sea, plus our cargo convoy would be there to pick them up. He announced that an enemy tank was within 400 yards of his command post firing at him and he had no ammunition with which to fight it. He said he would not be there in three hours. In his next message he said he was destroying his communications set and going into the woods. We were trying to get him to hold on when communication abruptly broke. We have two reports: (1) That the Brigade commander was seen going to sea in a small sailboat, and (2) That he had gone inland to Excambrey. The convoy started out to sea.

On the morning of D+3 the operations officers of the Elager and the Barbara J were transferred by rubber boat, along with six UDT men and personal weapons and radios, aboard the . Subsequently we boarded the aircraft carrier Essex along with the commander of the destroyer group, Captain Crutchfield, for the purpose of conferring with Admiral Clark and about effecting rescue operations. It was generally thought among all concerned that the Houston survivors could be sought only if the information concerning them was recent, accurate, and reliable. The 1 was dispatched towards Bahia Cochinos with our operations officers and UDT men aboard with the understanding that and Clark would seek information on the validity and accuracy of intelligence concerning survivors on the beach, and would send authorization or cancellation of that operation prior to the arrival of the 1 on station. The operation was cancelled by Admiral Clark and we spent the night sailing close to the beach for light signals. At daylight movement was seen on Cayo Blanco del Sur. A rubber boat was dispatched and contact made with four survivors, who were pulled aboard. A whaleboat was dispatched from the 1 with U-boats personnel aboard. The whaleboat would carry and three UDT men to a position 200 to 300 yards off the beach, from where we would make the approach and contact with the survivors by rubber boat. Seventeen survivors were removed in five separate operations by this group over a period of two days. Pre-dawn landings and reconnaissance were made each day to assure that Castro's militiamen hadn't occupied the island during the night. Similar activity was conducted by the Elager 1 and three UDT men on other beaches. The final day these two groups swept

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Cayao Miguel and Cayao Blanco del Sur and the island of Carrario. We carried loud speakers and searched in the mangrove swamps and tried to reassure hidden refugees that the arms we carried were not against them, but against Castro. They were afraid of our arms. For example, one man had been lying with only his face out of the water, and when he saw / , he tried to sink under water. We tried to assure him, but he thought that the writer was a Russian. He said that there were no friends any more, and we were Russians. We broadcast that if they would call to us, we would approach them without clothing and arms. During this operation Castro had helicopters calling as if they were they were saviors of the refugees and then submachine gun those who would show themselves. I believe that we missed many survivors because of the smallness of our patrol. We could not cover every square foot of these islands, and the refugees were afraid to expose themselves to us. All were in weakened condition and at times had to be carried to the boat.

On this night, the militiamen moved on to the islands and set fire to the brush and claimed to have driven out 166 survivors. I believe that this is an exaggeration.

and men returned to the
the Blegar were air-lifted

to the Essex and subsequently to Guantanamo and to headquarters.

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CUBAN PRISONERS RELEASE PROJECT


Interviewee: Mr. Joseph F. Dolan
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice


Interviewer: Mr. Francis J. Hunt DeRosa

Place: Mr. Dolan's Office

Date: July 8, 1964

Mr. Dolan: After the entire project had been completed, the President was kind enough to extend an invitation to some of the people who had participated in it at all levels from Mr. Louis Oberdorfer to and including the secretaries to attend the ceremony in the Orange Bowl. On very short notice we were told that if we went to the National Airport at quarter to five in the morning we would be flown to Florida, which we did, and arrived just barely in time at the Orange Bowl stadium, just as the President began to speak. It was one of the most moving experiences I have ever had. The Brigade was there, and the families were in the stands.


Interviewee


Interviewer

The President spoke quite simply, but quite eloquently. After he had concluded his remarks, we were all seated over in one side of the stadium in the small stands behind the goal line. As he came to leave the stadium, he stopped there and came over and shook hands and said hello to all of us who were there, which we appreciated very much. That was on the 29th of December in 1962.

Mr. Dolan: About Friday, December 7, 1962, I was told that Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer had been trying to get me the day before and wanted to see me on something that was of great importance. When I arrived at his office, I saw that there were four or five people sitting around his desk talking. Lou Oberdorfer looked up and said to me, "Bob has a project going; we are going to try to get the Cuban prisoners out." I said, "Oh, damn." Everybody looked at me in a surprised way. I sat down and was there for about a minute or a minute and a half, when all of a sudden I said, "Oh." Lou said, "What is the matter?" I said, "You mean we are going to negotiate." Everybody laughed. I really thought that with Bob Kennedy we were going to get something going with some boats and we were going down to get the prisoners out. I had just returned from Oxford, Mississippi, and expected anything. I didn't think we were going to use drugs or anything else. We embarked that day on expanding the personnel that was available

to us. Everybody who came in was asked whether he knew anybody in private practice in town who could shake loose for a few days hard work who would be our kind of guy, which around here means a fellow who is a utility infielder, that is, someone who will do anything that he is asked to and will take care of any problem that comes up whether it is emptying the ash trays or going to see the President. A few people were suggested - John Douglas, Ray Rasenberger, and John Nolan. Nolan and Douglas have since joined the Department of Justice. Douglas was already scheduled to join us as the head of the Civil Division and was in the process of coming over.

Mr. Dolan: We roughed out areas of responsibility. As I recall, I was supposed to ride herd on the assembly of pharmaceuticals. The first major task that was thrown at me was the list of materials that Castro wanted. It had been presented to Donovan, I think, sometime before and was in Spanish. I was told to look it over and see what we could do with it and how we could go about getting the material together. We had to get the list translated right away, and we made the necessary arrangements through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to get it translated. They did a superb job and got it done in about two or three days. At the same time we had made copies of it and contacted some people in various

trade associations who had technical backgrounds and asked them to look at it to see whether they could do anything with it. While there were a number of spots where they were completely stuck unless it was translated, a considerable portion of it could be completely utilized in Spanish.

Mr. Dolan: On Sunday, it would be about the 9th of December, in the afternoon, the presidents of most of the larger manufacturers of baby food came to the Department of Justice - very quietly as this was all done without any public announcement - and were met by the Attorney General, who made an excellent, very frank and blunt presentation to them of the problem.

Mr. DeRosa: Do you remember it?

Mr. Dolan: I remember the Attorney General saying that the President assumed the complete responsibility for getting those men in there and the President thought that we ought to get those men out. The Attorney General was, I thought, in a very difficult position. You could just see the businessmen, and maybe I was imagining things, but I don't think there were too many Democrats in the crowd, and I don't think there was anybody in the room who was from the baby food manufacturers who was within fifteen years of Bob Kennedy. The Attorney General was in a sports jacket or casual dress, as he had come in from his home suddenly. The businessmen

all looked to me like they were saying, "What's that kid there think he is Attorney General for?" Then when he started to speak, this attitude changed.

Mr. Dolan: Afterwards one or two of them who had been contacted, I think individually before, told what they thought they could do. As you know, the tax laws played an important part in it, which is, I suppose, one of the many reasons why Mr. Oberdorfer got involved in it as heavily as he did. He understood these implications very readily. The companies were able to make charitable contributions. It was towards the end of the year, and many of the corporations had not made contributions up to their five percent limit to which they were entitled. They could calculate in many instances that the economic cost to them was even negligible, or not nearly as great as it might be under other circumstances.

Mr. Dolan: None of us knew anything about any of the problems. Nobody knew anything about transportation, drugs, or baby food; but everybody set about to look for people who did to try to get the necessary information. There were very few records kept. I had a little hand notebook that all of us who had been down South in the Oxford situation had gotten accustomed to using.

Mr. Dolan: During this project I had very few contacts with the Attorney General. However, there was a very memorable one

at the close of the project which I should mention. As I recall, it was on Christmas Eve. I think Mr. Oberdorfer was in Miami. The prisoners had arrived, and Nick Katzenbach and Hurwitch of State and myself were in Mr. Oberdorfer's office. Mr. Katzenbach called the Attorney General, who was out at home with his children. He said, "Bob, they are all in; it's over." Bob said, "That is fine." (Bob had just finished talking to Jim Donovan on a three-way conversation in which our office was also included.) Bob said, "Well, all right." Nick said, "Bob, I don't think I will come in tomorrow," meaning Christmas day. There was a pause, and Bob said, "Why not?" Nick said, "No reason at all Bob; I'm just not coming in." Everybody laughed. The Attorney General then said, "All right you guys, what about Jimmy Hoffa?" That was the close. I think it was just a very succinct indication of the kind of executive that the Attorney General is - always on to the next hill, on to the next hill, on to the next hill. Then maybe sometime if you are sitting by a swimming pool or if you are sitting some place where you don't have anything to do, then you might reminisce a little bit - a very little bit.

Mr. Dolan: I think the project couldn't possibly have been a success if you hadn't had a number of people who were quite dedicated and had a lot of energy and who were willing to do anything.

If somebody else wasn't there, you answered the phone and filled in for them, and somebody else filled in for you. At various times one or more of us would go over to the Red Cross headquarters to help over there as a contact point in assembling the material. I can recall on the transportation that Barrett Prettyman was in charge of arranging maritime shipments for some reason. I guess maybe he had a steamship company for a client once and he knew what gross tonnage was or something. I knew a fellow at the Air Transport Association. I was given the responsibility of getting all the air transport. We did get it. It involved a couple of phone calls to the effect, "We are doing this, the President is quite interested in it, these manufacturers have indicated that they can get this much material, time is of the essence, what do you think you can do." The affirmative answer came back; the carriers all got together. They made pickups in various parts of the country. There businessmen did move in and handle it in businesslike fashion. Pan Am handled the transportation of the personnel.

Mr. Dolan: We pulled in Don Coppock of the Border Patrol to sit in a room down the hall and help assemble information that was being phoned into us by different manufacturers - how much they had pledged, how much was on hand, how much was moving towards the port. We picked Don Coppock because he had been down at

Oxford. Mr. Oberdorfer and I had seen him, and the Deputy Attorney General had seen him. He was a fellow with a very cool head who didn't seem to be bothered about the fact that the problem didn't have anything to do with immigration. He said, "This is what the Government wants us to do; let's do it."

Mr. Dolan: On the drugs we just kept going down the list. When Castro asked for \$300,000 or something, we tried to find out from one or more manufacturers roughly how the market split on it. In many cases a specific drug was named, the trade name of a specific manufacturer. There obviously you invited the attention of that manufacturer to that particular commodity and asked him could he do it and what would be a substitute if he couldn't. We did make many substitutions. We were able to convince the Cubans that they were getting materials that would accomplish the same objective.

Mr. DeRosa: Did you get in touch with a manufacturer yourself, or rather through the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association?

Mr. Dolan: We would do both, but mostly through the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. Also, they would start calling us. It was done both ways.

Mr. DeRosa: What were the main problems in getting the drugs or dealing with the drug industry?

Mr. Dolan: Time. This was the 7th of December, and we were given indicate that very very limited time was available and that if we didn't have them out by Christmas we probably wouldn't get them out.

Mr. Dolan: Another problem was the narcotics. We had to have permits, so we had export problems. We had to deal with the Department of Commerce on what required a license, what didn't, and how to get the license for it. The narcotics people were quite interested in how much was going. Another thing we did very early in the project was to have the list evaluated as to whether or not what Castro was asking for was reasonable in the sense that it might well be consumed within Cuba within a reasonable period of time. We were most concerned about the possibility of it being transshipped. The manufacturers were most concerned also; they didn't want to see their markets in other countries spoiled by or lessened by a charitable contribution that they made that was supposed to be used in Cuba. This evaluation was made by people in various departments of the Government and in some cases by people in private industry.

Mr. DeRosa: Did you ever have any problems with firms who had pending business with the Department of Justice?

Mr. Dolan: No, all of the manufacturers were, I think concerned about the antitrust aspects of their actions. The sensible

businessman is always alert to possible difficulties that occur when he gets in a room with one of his competitors. We had them talk to the antitrust people and in some cases had some policy clearances given on certain actions. We have a clearance policy in the Department where proposals of courses of action can be presented to the Government and the Government may respond that, as they understand it, this course of action doesn't violate the law.

Mr. DeRosa: Were there any discussions that you know of regarding the political feasibility of the whole project?

Mr. Dolan: Well, it was most perilous. I think everybody was quite aware of what would have happened if we had gotten three million dollars worth of stuff on the dock and hadn't gotten the prisoners out. The Attorney General, or maybe the President, made the final decision. One of the reasons I wanted John Kennedy for President was that I thought he had judgment and I thought he had courage, but I also thought he had a lot of nerve, not in the sense of gall, but in the sense of ability to steer a good course through shoals. Any President of the United States in this day and age has got to have it. You just couldn't have any feel for politics at all without realizing that just to start this project you had to be willing to go all the way to the end. You had to recognize that the odds were probably against success. I thought Castro would up the ante. That

was my fear. Then it would have really called for some tough negotiating. If Castro had understood the domestic political implications of the project, he might have. All that stuff was down on the dock. If he had asked for another two million or released only half the prisoners or said I have looked these drugs over and the market value doesn't measure up, we would have been in trouble. It really could have been a problem. We all knew that we could fall on our faces.

Mr. Dolan: The Attorney General had told the baby food manufacturers that the President felt a very strong moral responsibility towards the prisoners. Those men had gone down there to try to free their country, and they would not have been there if it had not been for actions taken by the Government of the United States. They had gone in voluntarily, etc., but they wouldn't have been there if we hadn't done some things. He thought we had a responsibility and thought we had an obligation to try to save their lives. We didn't know what would happen if we left them there in prison. We knew they wouldn't all survive.

Mr. DeRosa: Do you want to say anything about the tremendous amount of improvising that went on?

Mr. Dolan: Mr. Oberdorfer was used to it. He had been with us at Montgomery in 1961 and Oxford in 1962. For Lou and myself

and Ed Guthman, who was the public information officer who handled the public information aspects, it was another operation just like the civil rights problems had been in Montgomery. The three of us had been involved in Montgomery with the freedom riders riots and the church riots at which point the Justice Department had fielded 750 special deputy marshalls on 24 hours notice drawn from all over the country. In Oxford it took 48 hours notice to field about 450. None of us had had any particular military training. We had all had military experience, but none of us had mounted an operation like that. We just thought, "Well, you just do what comes naturally." For Ray Rasenberger, John Nolan, Barrett Prettyman, and John Douglas, unless they had done something similar to it in the service, I guess it was a completely new experience, but they certainly didn't act that way. For Don Coppock it was also a rerun. You learned from each of them, although we don't take much time to do critiques afterwards. We noticed when we were down on the school desegregations in Alabama and the racial problems in Birmingham last year that things just sort of came to you a little quicker and a little easier once you had been through it. You wouldn't think that there would be a carry-over from racial problems to getting the Cuban prisoners released.

Mr. Dolan: One thing that made this project work is due to a characteristic of the Attorney General, that the greatest sin is not doing something because you are afraid that you might not do

it well. If you don't field the ball, you could be off the team, and you never get the ball again. You can make horrendous mistakes with the Attorney General, and he is quite understanding. He is not particularly interested in explanations; he is not at all interested in excuses, and he really doesn't have time to listen to explanations. You just say to him, "I goofed" or "Bob, I couldn't get the job done, so I asked Nick to do it." He'll answer okay and nothing else. He wants to get the job done. In many respects he is the world's worst executive, but as far as getting the job done he is the best one I ever worked for. He always has his eye on the ball, on what he is trying to get. The methods are diverse and many, and he will turn to anybody. If Mr. Oberdorfer is not there, you ask the Deputy. If he is not there, you ask Joe Dolan, etc. Then they are supposed to get it back on the track to the person who can do it better as quickly and as readily as you can. You don't stand on ceremony. He has always been that way. I don't know how much of it comes from his personality or how much of it is ingrained. I always thought that some it came from the fact that a considerable portion of his early experience came from political campaigns which are to a great extent ad hoc operations. You have a volunteer personnel. If you have any sense at all, you utilize services of people before you know whether or not they are reliable. You use untested people because if you use only tested people you won't have enough people.

You can't possibly have enough, so you use everybody. Then you winnow out, and you pick and choose. You don't let this fellow do it the second time because he didn't do it right the first time. You give him something else. You have a rough sorting out, but you never stop to sort. Bob never pauses to regroup and say, "Now what shall we do?" When he is saying, "What shall we do now," he is doing something.


Mr. Dolan: John Jones, First Assistant, Tax Division, was in on this project every minute. He was on anchor there. You know we had a 24-hour duty roster. People would stay through the night as calls would come in. John was one of the people who got on night duty. We always had to have somebody at what I would call an intermediate level of responsibility there. The Deputy wasn't there too much, as he was up here and had the really big responsibility - the major responsibility. Mr. Oberdorfer was similar to an executive vice-president. He had to know all the details of what was going on.

Mr. Dolan: With regard to contacting a potential contributor you would make a very brief statement of what the project was, what its objective was, and how you happened to call them. It usually involved the fact that the Cuban Government had furnished a list to Jim Donovan on which a commodity that they manufactured was identified, and the Cuban Government said that Cuba was in


need of these supplies. Also, if we were able to assemble a sufficient quantity of them in sufficient dollar value, the Cubans would release these prisoners. It was stated in a muted sort of way that this wasn't money completely out of their pocket. In some cases, if a man had a certain situation, which most of them didn't have, he could make a profit out of making the gift. I don't think many of them did. The cost to them was much less than the cost would be otherwise. We would ask them to consider it and see what they could do and would tell them of the urgency of time. We would also ask them where the goods would be and what transportation they usually utilized. After the pledge was made, then we started working out the transportation arrangement.

Mr. Dolan: I would say that I am sure that everybody who was involved is very proud to have been involved. The feeling that I had when I was in the Orange Bowl and saw those guys there and saw them march by I will just never forget. It was a great humanitarian project. I remember that a friend of mine in Denver, a Jewish lady who was active in a good number of Jewish organizations, was quite upset and sad when discussing this project. I asked, "What is the matter?" She answered, "Did you ever stop to think that if Bob Kennedy had been in Government in 1937 or 38, he would have figured out how to get those six million Jews out of Europe alive?" I don't

know whether he would have gotten six million, but I know that he would have done quite a bit. In certain instances, and I think such instances are more and more frequent in our society in this day and age, you need somebody with a lot of nerve and with a lot of willingness to fall on his face, somebody who will jump into something that has never been done before, something that everybody says can't be done. We need someone who in such a situation will say, "Well, I think we are going to do it." That is the kind of fellow the Attorney General is.



Interviewee



Interviewer

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Walt W. Rostow

DATE: February 14, 1961

FROM : Kenneth P. Landon

SUBJECT: Peace Corps International


I. The Need for Peace Corps International

The free nations of the world, and those who wish to be free of Communist threat, lack a cohesive apparatus to make their efforts affirmative rather than defensive. We have nothing comparable to the interplay among the Communist and Worker Parties which encircle the world. We have no Congress of free peoples' representatives who assemble annually to discuss their tactics for the coming year or decade. In governmental affairs our administrative agencies are not linked or controlled by an ideological and propaganda organization like the Communist Party.

The usual conclusion is that free people cannot copy Soviet models a la Marx and Lenin in solving problems of national and international political communication and mutual help. We have no structure of party and commissars for democratic evolution, nor could we have. So the orthodox conclusion is that we must fight Communism on a free-for-all basis, each nation for itself, except for those alliances of a NATO, SEATO or bilateral nature which corset our democratic strength in particular regions in specially defined ways of a military and economic nature. We are thus engaged in a holding action, or a defensive alliance, or an "unmasking" of the enemy. But we have no plan for a holy alliance of free people who aggressively wish to be free. We assume that open societies without formalized dogma cannot develop an international apparatus without sacrificing their sovereignty in some measure.

Some efforts have been made to conceive of an ideological common denominator on which the free peoples of the world might unite. One such effort was called "Militant Liberty" and had a brief vogue in the Pentagon and was debated seriously at the defunct Operations Coordinating Board. Another effort was to identify all people who believed in God as true allies.

The problem should be approached in the "Rotary International" or "Chamber of Commerce" manner which is less interested in what people think than in what they want and do. Free-minded people want freedom to

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act in their own ways and have many ways of expressing the concept and many ways of seeking fulfillment. Such diversity can be made into a unifying force if properly directed.

Consideration should be given to the formation of a people-to-people international organization which might be an internationalizing of the President's "Peace Corps" concept, extending the idea to the formation of "Peace Corps" in all free-minded nations for mutual self-help.

"Peace Corps International" could be set up to have inter-communications among the national chapters, and to hold an annual world-wide Congress to lay plans for mutual efforts in crucial areas threatened by the Communists. Merely because people think differently about God or government is no reason to assume they cannot work together for a political freedom desired by all -- free to lead their individual and national lives in their own way.

Could the original planners for the President's "Peace Corps" be presented with this additional concept for linking the people in all nations who are ready and willing to work together for freedom? Could the President propose "Peace Corps International" as a recognition of the fact that all free nations have contributions to make to the cause of freedom?

II. How to Promote Peace Corps International

A successful technique which might be used to promote Peace Corps International is the use of "proprietary" organizations controlled and financed by the U. S. Government through ICA covert channels in the mass media field. Such proprietary organizations have impressively demonstrated their power and effectiveness in the past in carrying out special tasks of information or promotion.

The Communists have a world-wide apparatus and there is a hard core of Communist "faithful" in almost every country in the world. They are no smarter than we are and there is no need to assume the self-defeating premise that we can't develop a world-wide apparatus on a free and imaginative basis.

III. Recommendation:

That the planners for the President's Peace Corps be requested to explore ways of developing "Peace Corps International," to become an instrument for all free people to use in mutually agreed self-help programs.

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STATEMENT OF ROBERT SARGENT SHRIVER, JR., DIRECTOR OF THE PEACE CORPS, IN

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, May 17, 1961.

I have just returned from a series of exploratory visits to eight countries in Africa and Asia, a trip intended to determine more exactly the extent of the need for Peace Corps activities in these countries and the newly developing nations of the world.

The members of our Peace Corps group were, in addition to myself, Harris L. Wofford, a Special Assistant to President Kennedy; Edwin R. Bayley, Peace Corps Public Information Director; and Franklin H. Williams, Peace Corps Advisor on co-operation with the United Nations and International Agencies.

In each country we conferred at length with leading officials, with ministers and secretaries directly involved with possible Peace Corps operations, with members of United States technical assistance missions, with Embassy staffs and with representatives of United Nations and voluntary agencies operating in that area. In most cases we were able to make field trips into areas in which Peace Corps volunteers may work, so that we could see at first hand the circumstances of need and the conditions under which volunteers would live and work.

We have been able to reach a number of conclusions.

First, the Peace Corps is wanted and is welcome in every country we visited. Prime Minister Nehru of India, President Nkrumah of Ghana, and Prime Minister U Nu of Burma want Peace Corps volunteers and they want them to succeed. So do the leaders of Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. We learned this not only from prime ministers and presidents, but from the ordinary people in these countries.

In India's Punjab, for example, we talked to the headman of a village. He said: "If someone from the Peace Corps would come here, we would welcome him. Whatever poor facilities we have, we would share with him."

In another country the governor of a province said: "We have the mind and the heart to do things. Our people are ready to move. We need your skills to help us start."

Second, the requests for Peace Corps assistance will far exceed the present supply of qualified volunteers. In nearly every case we shall be able to meet only a small part of the need. In just the eight countries we visited, requests were made for volunteers to fill more than 3500 jobs. So there will be no problem in placing the 500 to 1000 volunteers established as a 1961 goal by President Kennedy.

I am convinced that if, in the future, our country is to meet the unparalleled opportunity to win friends and advance the cause of peace and freedom, thousands of additional Americans will have to step forward and say, "I will serve."

Third, the Peace Corps must expect attacks from communist propagandists or even from ill-informed nationalists. In one country, for example, a pro-communist newspaper demanded during our visit that the government "get Mr. Shriver and his Peace Corps guerrillas" out of the country.

Fourth, the manner, the mode, and the way Peace Corps volunteers carry out their work will be just as important as the quality of their work. Peace Corps volunteers must go in a spirit of humility, seeking to learn as much as to teach.

Fifth, the Peace Corps offers a major opportunity for large numbers of Americans to serve their country overseas in peaceful ways and with great benefit to their own educational, professional, and human development.

Sixth, Peace Corps work will be difficult and demanding. Frequent doubts were expressed about the willingness and ability of Americans -- young and old -- to give up luxuries like automobiles, air conditioning, and television to take up the challenging life of the average citizen in Africa or Asia.

As one official put it: "Do you really think that your American Peace Corps volunteers will be able to compete successfully with the Chinese Communists who are coming here to help us with skilled workers? Do you think these young Americans, fresh from Kokomo, have the strength and the determination to live in small towns and villages with the common people?"

In New Delhi, an Indian woman -- who was a close associate of Mahatma Gandhi -- said: "Yours was the first revolution. Do you think young Americans possess the spiritual values they must have to bring the spirit of that revolution to our country?"

Seventh, America's greatest challenge is to mobilize our national will behind a major international effort to advance the cause of peace and freedom. In wartime, we were able to harness the full energy of our people to achieve victory. We must do the same thing in the fight for peace. There is a war on -- a war against ignorance, poverty, disease, and all forms of oppression. Changes sweeping Asia, Africa, and Latin America demand effective action to solve ancient problems.

The Communists are offering a totalitarian solution. We must demonstrate -- and help the developing peoples of the world to show -- that democratic methods are ultimately the most successful way to solve their problems.

A massive effort -- greater, in fact, than the effort we made twice this century in war -- is needed for peace. This kind of effort alone will make the peace that is won meaningful in the eyes of the world.

We hope the Peace Corps may take its place as one part of a total, national effort.

FOR RELEASE TO A.M. PAPERS
SUNDAY, MARCH 5, 1961

March 4, 1961

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

SUMMARY OF REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE PEACE CORPS
from Sargent Shriver

The following summary report, along with other supporting documents, were submitted to the President earlier this week.

Mr. Shriver, former president of the Chicago Board of Education, has, for some weeks, headed a task force to prepare the President's program for the Peace Corps.

February 28, 1961

SUMMARY OF REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE PEACE CORPS

From Sargent Shriver

Having studied at your request the problems of establishing a Peace Corps, I recommend its immediate establishment.

To find answers to the main questions about the Peace Corps I have considered the report to you on this subject by Dr. Max Millikan of M.I.T., a report by Professor Sam Hayes of the University of Michigan, and reports by the Institute of International Education, the National Student Association, and others. I have consulted with Representative Reuss and Senator Humphrey who, with the late Senator Newberger, were the first champions of Congressional action for a peace corps or international youth service. I have studied the report of Dr. Maurice Albertson and his colleagues of Colorado State University who, at the direction of Congress, have traveled to Asia, Africa and Latin America surveying specific needs for Peace Corps volunteers and responses to this idea. For several weeks I have worked on this with a task force drawn from private organizations, the International Cooperation Administration and the White House.

I am satisfied that we have sufficient answers to justify your going ahead. But since the Peace Corps is a new experiment in international cooperation many of the questions considered below will only be finally answered in action, by trial and error. Our tentative conclusions are therefore submitted as working hypotheses.

1. What do we mean by a Peace Corps? The essential idea is the placement of Americans in actual operational work in newly developing areas of the world. Unlike most ICA technical assistance advisors, who go as members of an official US Mission to demonstrate or advise, Peace Corps volunteers will go to teach, or to build, or to work in the communities to which they are sent. They will serve local institutions, living with the people they are helping. Most Peace Corps volunteers will probably be young college graduates, but there should be no rigid age limit. Younger or older workers with skills needed abroad but without college degrees will carry out some important projects. The length of service should normally be from two to three years.

2. Is there a need for it? The need of most newly developing nations for skilled manpower in many critical positions is manifest. The Colorado State University team reports that the need for trained Peace Corps volunteers is felt in every country in Latin America, Africa and Asia visited. If the shortages of able personnel are not made up from outside some development programs will grind to a halt -- or fail to progress fast enough to satisfy the newly aroused and volatile expectations of the people of these lands. The Peace Corps can make a significant contribution to this problem.

While Dr. Albertson and his colleagues report a great variety of needs in the countries visited, the major programs in which Peace Corps volunteers are wanted are these:

- a. Teaching. Literacy and higher levels of knowledge and skills are a prerequisite to successful national development. The United States concentration on public education in the 19th century was a major factor in our industrial revolution. In most newly developing nations the shortage of teachers is a major bottleneck. In Nigeria an official commission has just documented how dangerous this bottleneck is--and how badly outside teachers are needed. Since in many African and some Asian countries teaching is conducted in English, U.S. college graduates could play a vital role teaching in primary or secondary schools and in trade schools. In many others developing nations the teaching of English is wanted. And in Latin America the teaching of literacy in Spanish is required--a useful field for Spanish-speaking U.S. graduates.
- b. Fighting Malaria and Working in Other Health Projects. The world-wide Malaria Eradication program is another important contribution to economic development. The loss of productivity and social energy in malaria-infected areas causes a serious slow-down in progress. The UN-sponsored campaign to eradicate malaria needs a large number of workers, many of whom would not need to be college graduates. Similarly, along with doctors and nurses, personnel are needed for work in inoculation campaigns against typhoid, smallpox, and tetanus and in water sanitation programs.
- c. Working in Agricultural Projects and Rural Development Programs. In addition to top-level technical advisors already being provided by ICA and other agencies, skilled agricultural workers are needed to assure the effectiveness of demonstration programs for animal husbandry, new farm techniques, improvement of seed, and irrigation. Peace Corps volunteers are needed to work alongside host country citizens in community development programs. In many countries the educated young people cannot be persuaded to return to the villages or to do manual labor. The presence of U.S. Peace Corps volunteers can challenge them to undertake this essential work and contribute to the spirit of national service needed for the mobilization of the host country's full human resources. While it would not be generally practical for the Peace Corps to supply unskilled manual labor, in many places the shortage of any skills is so great that there is a real need for semi-skilled Peace Corps volunteers who can assist with the construction of schools, self-help housing, feeder roads, and other small-scale public projects.
- d. Working on Large-Scale Construction and Industrial Projects. Here the need for generally skilled workers is obvious. On most of the large dams, valley developments, construction of new cities, or establishment of modern factories, the employment of skilled operating personnel from outside has been necessary to do a great range of skilled and semi-skilled jobs. If proper terms of service can be arranged, Peace Corps volunteers from trade unions or U.S. businesses can provide some of the needed help, including on-the-job training to local personnel.
- e. Working in Government Administration. Many Peace Corps volunteers will be needed in public administration on all levels, including urban development.

These are some of the clear and present needs. It will be important for the Peace Corps to establish procedures with the host countries for the appraisal of each project in terms of the particular country's priorities of development needs. When there is no pressing need or desire--where local persons are trained and ready--no Peace Corps volunteers should be sent.

3. How would it operate? The Peace Corps staff must have great flexibility to experiment with different methods of operation. Its role, as we see it, will be to reinforce existing private and public programs of assistance and development by filling some of the manpower gaps which obstruct these programs, and to initiate new programs requiring Peace Corps volunteers. The Peace Corps will be closely related to other programs of assistance, and its potentialities will of course depend in part upon what is done through other parts of our foreign aid effort. The Peace Corps should take its place as a basic component of our whole overseas program.

The resources, energy and experience of our non-governmental institutions, including colleges and universities, foundations, trade unions, businesses, civic groups and religious bodies must be tapped. This must be a cooperative venture of the whole American people.

To accomplish this, the Peace Corps should seek to provide skilled manpower to developing nations through at least five different channels.

- a. Through grants to Peace Corps-type programs carried out by private agencies. This would result in the expansion of the existing voluntary agency activities using dedicated Americans overseas, and in the encouragement of other private organizations to undertake such projects. Trade Unions would be urged to participate in this program. It is important that the Peace Corps supplement and extend the early pioneering efforts of the private agencies rather than by-pass them or swallow them up in a Federal program. It was the success of these private efforts which led to the development of the Peace Corps idea. The variety and experimental quality of these projects must not be lost.

Under this program private agencies would submit proposed Peace Corps-type projects to the Peace Corps staff. These projects would be reviewed in the light of Peace Corps standards and funds would be allocated according to the priorities determined and the total budget available. The Peace Corps might support such projects in whole or in part, perhaps in the form of financing the round-trip sea transportation of the persons sent abroad.

There would be a minimum of red tape involved. The Peace Corps staff would follow the project to see that it was in fact worthwhile and soundly administered, that the selection, training and compensation of the volunteers met certain standards, and that no activities inconsistent with the Peace Corps were carried on, such as religious proselytizing or propagandizing.

- b. Through arrangements with colleges, universities, or other educational institutions. Already some 57 universities are working under contract with ICA in 37 countries on development or educational projects. While few, if any, of these contracts presently meet the criteria of the Peace Corps, they demonstrate the possibilities. Universities are capable of carrying the responsibility of many Peace Corps projects, particularly in the field of education. Teachers College at Columbia University has just recently agreed to recruit and administer a program of supplying some 150 English teachers for East Africa. Larger teaching projects might be carried out by a group of colleges and universities in a state or area, or by a group of schools emphasizing the same language or area study.

Universities offer several advantages: They are able to recruit on the spot, from among their own students, using their own knowledge of the student as a basis for selection. They are able to provide the training either over a four-year period or in special sessions after graduation. They can provide faculty as supervisors overseas. They can develop area studies and research programs which assist their Peace Corp volunteers and which also benefit from what the returning volunteers have learned.

And the Peace Corps can help the Universities by giving new purpose to the student during his years of study. One University official already reports that students are studying their Spanish more seriously in view of the prospect of a University Peace Corps project in Latin America. In a larger sense, University involvement in the right projects can help American education expand its horizon--its research and its curriculum--to the whole world. It is time for American Universities to become truly world universities. The Peace Corps will help them with this transformation.

But unlike the voluntary agencies whose business is overseas work, this is a new and peripheral field for universities. The Peace Corps staff will need in many cases to seek out a university or group of universities to undertake particular projects suggested by the particular developing nation or nations. In most cases the Peace Corps staff will be needed in the initial negotiations with foreign governments.

Although there is no reason to believe that the costs of carrying out Peace Corps projects through university contracts will be low, the advantages of this approach should weigh heavily against any inefficiency in such decentralization. Wherever feasible it is recommended that Peace Corps projects be conducted in this way. The Peace Corps is in fact a great venture in the education of Americans and of people in the newly developing nations. As a high educational venture its proper carriers are our traditional institutions of higher education.

- c. Through programs of other U.S. Government agencies. There is a need for "Technician Helpers" to supplement many existing technical and economic assistance projects being carried out by existing U.S. Government agencies. Top-level advisors working for I.C.A., or for the U.S. Information Service, or for other Government agencies all generally report the need for operational assistance--for

personnel at the working level who can help translate high-level advice into action on the line. Through a national recruitment, training and placement service the Peace Corps can supply such Technician Helpers. This will broaden and deepen the impact of our present aid programs.

- d. Through programs of the U.N. and other international agencies. U.N. and other international technical assistance and development programs also suffer the same gap between the advice and its implementation. Technician Helpers for these programs, recruited by the Peace Corps, could help translate the expertise of these UN missions into action and achievement.
- e. Through directly administered Peace Corps programs with host countries. There will be some projects of a size or complexity or novelty or urgency which cannot be carried out, or carried out well, through any of the above channels. If such projects are proposed by host countries and fit the developmental needs of those countries and the overall foreign aid purposes of the United States, they can be undertaken through Peace Corps recruitment, training, and direct administration. For example, some larger--scale teaching programs may best be administered directly, perhaps using university campuses and facilities on contract for training purposes. Construction projects using skilled workers who are not college graduates may also call for direct Peace Corps Administration.

4. How would the Peace Corps Volunteers be Selected?

For projects administered directly by the Peace Corps there will have to be a general nation-wide recruitment program. Although private agencies and universities will be able to recruit directly and separately for their respective projects, they, too, may often wish to utilize the central recruitment service. And the central service, in turn will probably want to have in its files the results of the separate recruitment by private agencies and universities.

Therefore, one important function of the Peace Corps staff will be to set up and maintain a general recruitment and selection process, which can build up a pool of applicants and serve as a central placement center for volunteers for world development.

The central service will also help assure that the Peace Corps will have the broadest possible national base. As a practical matter the Peace Corps will need a large pool of applicants, if the best available talent is to be found. Widespread competition for Peace Corps positions with very careful screening is essential if people with the best chance of success are to be sent abroad.

5. How would the Volunteers be Trained?

Once the Peace Corps is a going concern, training for it should be integrated so far as possible within the four year college curriculum of students interested in going overseas after graduation. The Peace Corps should set standards such as intensive language study and completion of courses on the history, economics, politics, and culture of the area to which the student would like to be sent -- as well as sufficient study of American history and society to make him a well-informed representative of this country abroad. If a student intends to go into Peace Corps teaching he should take available courses in teaching methods.

Even with this prior preparation some final training and orientation for particular Peace Corps projects will be necessary. It will also be necessary for volunteers who are not college students.

The Peace Corps must organize such training programs, using college and university facilities wherever feasible. The length of the programs would vary from six weeks to perhaps even six months. There will be great emphasis on language instruction and preparation for the particular work to be assigned, such as teaching. There will also be briefing on practical problems of health and living in the country assigned.

The organization of adequate training programs will have an urgent priority in the first months of the Corps, particularly since prior college preparation for the Peace Corps will in most cases be missing the first year of operation.

Wherever possible, to draw on available talent and make this venture mutual and international from the beginning, foreign students and teachers in this country should be involved in the training program.

6. What would be the Terms of Service?

The usual length of service should probably be two years, with perhaps three year terms in some cases. Great flexibility must be permitted to accommodate projects with differing difficulties and needs.

From the training period throughout his term of service, the Peace Corps volunteer would be subject to immediate separation from the service and return home. There must be adequate supervision by the

Peace Corps Staff so that those who do not adjust to the new challenges can be promptly separated before their failure unduly damages them and the program.

While there should be no general age limit or restriction to one sex, there will be particular projects requiring special maturity and some open only to men or to women. The Peace Corps should not pay the expenses of a wife or family, unless the wife is also accepted for full-time Peace Corps work on the same project.

There should be no draft exemption because of Peace Corps service. In most cases service in the Corps will probably be considered a ground for temporary deferment.

Peace Corps volunteers obviously should not be paid what they might earn in comparable activities in the United States. Nor would it be possible in many cases for them to live in health or any effectiveness on what their counterparts abroad are paid. The guiding principle indeed should not be anything like compensation for individual services.

Rather the principle should be akin to that of the allowance. Peace Corps volunteers should be given just enough to provide a minimum decent standard of living. They should live in modest circumstances, avoiding all conspicuous consumption. Wherever possible they should live with their host country counterparts. Some special health requirements might have to be met. For example, it probably will be necessary for the Corps to have authority to pay medical expenses of volunteers. Perhaps existing Public Health Service, State Department and Armed Services medical facilities can be utilized.

For readjustment to the U. S., volunteers should be given some separation allowance at the end of their overseas service, based on the length of time served.

7. In what part of the government should the Peace Corps be established?

The idea of a Peace Corps has captured the imagination of a great many people. Support for it cuts across party, regional, ethnic and other lines. The Peace Corps, therefore, offers an opportunity to add a new dimension to our approach to the world -- an opportunity for the American people to think anew and start afresh in their participation in world development.

For this, the Peace Corps should be administered by a small, new, alive agency operating as one component in our whole overseas operation.

Pending the reorganization of our foreign aid structure and program, the Peace Corps should be established as an agency in the Department of State. When the aid operations are reorganized the Peace Corps should remain a semi-autonomous, functional unit. Meanwhile, the Peace Corps could be physically located in ICA's facilities and depend on the State Department and ICA for administrative support and, when needed, program assistance.

In this way the Peace Corps can be launched with its own identity and spirit and yet receive the necessary assistance from those now responsible for United States foreign policy and our overseas operations.

8. How and when should the Peace Corps be launched?

The Peace Corps can either begin in very low gear, with only preparatory work undertaken between now and when Congress finally appropriates special funds for it -- or it can be launched now and in earnest by executive action, with sufficient funds and made available from existing Mutual Security Appropriations to permit a number of substantial projects to start this summer.

The Peace Corps should be launched soon so that the opportunity to recruit the most qualified people from this year's graduating classes will not be lost. Nor should we lose the opportunity to use this summer for training on university campuses.

If launched in a careful but determined way within the next few weeks, the Peace Corps could have several hundred persons in training this summer for placement next Fall. Within a year or two several thousand might be in service. It can then grow steadily as it proves itself and as the need for it is demonstrated.

9. What would the first projects be?

In the first year there should probably be considerable emphasis on teaching projects. The need here is most clearly felt and our capacity to recruit and train qualified volunteers in a short period of time is greatest.

There would, however, be a variety of other skills -- medical, agricultural, engineering -- which would be called for in the first year through the private agency programs and through the provision of technician helpers to existing development projects.

The first year's projects should also be spread through several countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

10. How will the Peace Corps be received abroad?

Although the need for outside trained manpower exists in every newly developing nation, the readiness to receive such manpower, or to receive it from the United States will vary from country to country. A certain skepticism about the coming of Americans is to be expected in many quarters. Unfriendly political groups will no doubt do everything in their power to promote active hostility. But there are indications that many developing nations will welcome Peace Corps volunteers, and that if the volunteers are well chosen, they will soon demonstrate their value and make many friends.

It is important, however that the Peace Corps be advanced not as an arm of the Cold War but as a contribution to the world community. In presenting it to other governments and to the United Nations, we could propose that every nation consider the formation of its own peace corps and that the United Nations sponsor the idea and form an international coordinating committee. We should hope that peace corps projects will be truly international and that our citizens will find themselves working alongside citizens of the host country and also volunteers from other lands. In any case, our Peace Corps personnel should be offered as technician helpers in development projects of the U.N. and other international agencies.

The Peace Corps is not a diplomatic or propaganda venture but genuine experiment in international partnership. Our aim must be to learn as much as we teach. The Peace Corps offers an opportunity to bring home to the United States the problems of the world as well as an opportunity to meet urgent host country needs for trained manpower. If presented in this spirit, the response and the results will be immeasurably better.

11. How will it be financed? The already appropriated funds within the discretion of the President and Secretary of State under the Mutual Security Act are the only immediately available source of financing this summer's pilot programs of the Peace Corps. If it is decided to make a small shift which may be required from military aid or special assistance funds, in order to carry out the purposes of the Mutual Security Act through this new peaceful program, this will be a hopeful sign to the world. Congress should then be asked to give the Peace Corps a firm legislative foundation for the next fiscal year.

Specifically, Congress should consider authorizing the Peace Corps to receive contributions from American businesses, unions, civic organizations and the public at large. For this must be the project of the whole American people. An Advisory Council of outstanding public figures with experience in world affairs should be formed to give the program continuing guidance and to afford a focal point for public understanding.

Steps should also be taken to link the Food for Peace Program with the Peace Corps, so that foreign currencies accumulated by the sale of U. S. surplus food under P. L. 480 can be put to use to pay some of the host country expenses of Peace Corps personnel.

The extent to which participating bodies such as U. S. voluntary agencies, universities, international organizations, and the host country or institutions in the host country can and should share the costs of the Peace Corps programs must be fully explored.

12. Is it worth the cost and the risks? No matter how well conceived and efficiently run, there probably will be failures. These could be costly and have a serious effect both at home and abroad.

But as the popular response suggests, the potentiality of the Peace Corps is very great. It can contribute to the development of critical countries and regions. It can promote international cooperation and good will toward this country. It can also contribute to the education of America and to more intelligent American participation in the world.

With thousands of young Americans going to work in developing areas, millions of Americans will become more directly involved in the world than ever before.

With colleges and universities carrying a large part of the program, and with students looking toward Peace Corps service, there will be an impact on educational curriculum and student seriousness. The letters home, the talks later given by returning members of the Peace Corps, the influence on the lives of those who spend two or three years in hard work abroad--all this may combine to provide a substantial popular base for responsible American policies toward the world. And this is meeting the world's need, too, since what the world most needs from this country is better understanding of the world.

The Peace Corps thus can add a new dimension to America's world policy--one for which people here and abroad have long been waiting. As you said in your State of the Union message, "The problems. . . are towering and unprecedented--and the response must be towering and unprecedented as well."

March 1, 1961

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSEFOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHN
F. KENNEDY

I have today signed an Executive Order providing for the establishment of a Peace Corps on a temporary pilot basis. I am also sending to Congress a message proposing authorization of a permanent Peace Corps. This Corps will be a pool of trained American men and women sent overseas by the U.S. government or through private institutions and organizations to help foreign countries meet their urgent needs for skilled manpower.

It is our hope to have 500 or more people in the field by the end of the year.

The initial reactions to the Peace Corps proposal are convincing proof that we have, in this country, an immense reservoir of such men and women -- anxious to sacrifice their energies and time and toil to the cause of world peace and human progress.

In establishing our Peace Corps we intend to make full use of the resources and talents of private institutions and groups. Universities, voluntary agencies, labor unions and industry will be asked to share in this effort -- contributing diverse sources of energy and imagination -- making it clear that the responsibility for peace is the responsibility of our entire society.

We will only send abroad Americans who are wanted by the host country -- who have a real job to do -- and who are qualified to do that job. Programs will be developed with care, and after full negotiation, in order to make sure that the Peace Corps is wanted and will contribute to the welfare of other people. Our Peace Corps is not designed as an instrument of diplomacy or propaganda or ideological conflict. It is designed to permit our people to exercise more fully their responsibilities in the great common cause of world development.

Life in the Peace Corps will not be easy. There will be no salary and allowances will be at a level sufficient only to maintain health and meet basic needs. Men and women will be expected to work and live alongside the nationals of the country in which they are stationed -- doing the same work, eating the same food, talking the same language.

But if the life will not be easy, it will be rich and satisfying. For every young American who participates in the Peace Corps -- who works in a foreign land -- will know that he or she is sharing in the great common task of bringing to man that decent way of life which is the foundation of freedom and a condition of peace.

more

(OVER)

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE ORDER

10924
- - - -ESTABLISHMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PEACE CORPS
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 832, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1750 et. seq.), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment of the Peace Corps. The Secretary of State shall establish an agency in the Department of State which shall be known as the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps shall be headed by a Director.

Section 2. Functions of the Peace Corps. (a) The Peace Corps shall be responsible for the training and service abroad of men and women of the United States in new programs of assistance to nations and areas of the world, and in conjunction with or in support of existing economic assistance programs of the United States and of the United Nations and other international organizations.

(b) The Secretary of State shall delegate, or cause to be delegated, to the Director of the Peace Corps such of the functions under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, vested in the President and delegated to the Secretary, or vested in the Secretary, as the Secretary shall deem necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the Peace Corps.

Section 3. Financing of the Peace Corps. The Secretary of State shall provide for the financing of the Peace Corps with funds available to the Secretary for the performance of functions under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

Section 4. Relation to Executive Order No. 10893. This order shall not be deemed to supersede or derogate from any provision of Executive Order No. 10893 of November 8, 1960, as amended, and any delegation made by or pursuant to this order shall, unless otherwise specifically provided therein, be deemed to be in addition to any delegation made by or pursuant to that order.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,

March 1, 1961.

#

PEACE CORPS

Washington 25, D. C.

Re: Peace Corps Volunteer:
Frank A. Walker

Questionnaire No.:
006043

President John F. Kennedy
Washington, 25 D.C.

The above-named volunteer for service in the Peace Corps has indicated that you are in a position to give us a reliable evaluation of him. I shall appreciate your thoughtful appraisal of his qualifications for Peace Corps service.


The success of the Peace Corps will depend on the character of the volunteers who are chosen to serve. We must rely heavily on the judgment of people who know the applicant and who understand the grave responsibilities of representing the United States abroad.

A candid expression of opinion is necessary. No candidate will be eliminated on the basis of a single negative rating; supporting evidence will always be obtained from other sources. All information will be kept in confidence.

You can make a substantial contribution to the success of the Peace Corps and to the welfare of the above volunteer by carefully filling out and returning this form to me. The enclosed return envelope requires no postage.

I am grateful to you for your assistance in selecting the best of our men and women for service in the Peace Corps.

Sincerely yours,



Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr.
Director

Enclosure:
Return envelope.

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. 116-ROO4

Rating on Job Competence

Peace Corps volunteers will have to be competent. They must be able to do a job well. In your judgment, how competent is this candidate, as demonstrated by his work in school or college or on a job?

Check one:

- 5 ☐ Top 10% Extremely competent. Can always be counted on to do an excellent job.
- 4 ☐ Top 30% Very competent.
- 3 ☐ Top 70% Adequate but not outstanding.
- 2 ☐ Bottom 30% Doubtful.
- 1 ☐ Bottom 10% Incompetent. Has failed on many occasions to perform satisfactorily.

Please describe how candidate has demonstrated his level of competence.

What special assets does the candidate have that would qualify him for Peace Corps service?

Rating on Emotional Maturity

Peace Corps volunteers will work under conditions of hardship and deprivation. They will have to adapt to strange customs, unusual foods, primitive living conditions, extremes of climate, and other stressful circumstances. With these considerations in mind, how would you rate this candidate on emotional maturity and stability, on ability to tolerate stress, to work alone or under pressure, to cope with unusual difficulties?

Check one:

- 5 ☐ Top 10% Superb. Exceptionally mature and emotionally stable. Has demonstrated his ability to function effectively in periods of stress.
- 4 ☐ Top 30% Very good. Mature and emotionally stable.
- 3 ☐ Top 70% Good. About average in emotional stability and maturity for his age group. Will need supervision.
- 2 ☐ Bottom 30% Doubtful. There is reason to believe that candidate will not stand up well under stress.
- 1 ☐ Bottom 10% Poor. Candidate is emotionally unstable, has a history of emotional outbursts, of withdrawal, or of other signs of inability to cope with stress.

Comments on emotional maturity of candidate:

Do you have any knowledge of any behavior which shows that this applicant is not reliable, honest, or of good character? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes", please give details.

Rating on Relationships with Other People

Peace Corps volunteers will work mostly in small groups side by side with other volunteers and with the people of other countries, often in isolated rural areas with minimum supervision. Volunteers will work and live with people of all races, religions, and classes. How would you rate this candidate on relationships with other people?

Check one:

- 5 ☐ Top 10% Superb. Unusually effective in relationships with others. Works well alone or in groups. Can lead or follow as occasion demands. Is regarded as a good and dependable friend. Relates well to all kinds of people, respects them, and gains their respect.
- 4 ☐ Top 30% Very good. Works quite well with others.
- 3 ☐ Top 70% Good. About average in effectiveness of relationships with others for his age group. Will need supervision.
- 2 ☐ Bottom 30% Doubtful. There is reason to believe that the candidate will have difficulties working with others.
- 1 ☐ Bottom 10% Poor. Candidate cannot work effectively with others; is uncooperative or arouses antagonism needlessly. Distracts a group from its purposes or does not carry out his obligations. A distinct liability in a team endeavor.

Comments on candidate's relationships with other people:

(Date)

(Signature)

Please return this form to PEACE CORPS, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Peace Corps

Dear Mr. President :-

Your Peace Corps is
proving to be an asset in Colombia.

#1 The PC Volunteers are now actually
out in the small towns & villages (average
population 2,000 - 5,000). They're sleeping on cots,
eating the food - 3 times a day - at a cost
per man per day of 5 pesos (75¢). They are in
towns where no North Americans are living or
have lived. They are beginning to motivate local
persons into coop projects, water purification,
road building, etc.

#2 The top church officials & the
local priests have been cooperative. Our PCV's
are not living in homes of the priests (as
reported in Washington Star). They have their
own private accommodations which are shared in
every case with a Colombian counterpart.
But cooperation from Church & local priests
is essential to success. We're getting it.

#3 The PCV's are located in pairs in 30 different towns all over Colombia. As soon as we can double the number of our PCV's in Colombia, we'll move into 60 different locations (see next point)

#4 - President Lleras was most complimentary about you personally - happy that "you chose Colombia for first So. Amer. P.C. project"... expressed his gratitude "for the quality of volunteers you have sent to Colombia". AND he has agreed to a 100% increase in the total number of PCV's here in Colombia. This is not a new project - just an increase in existing one.

#5 Our PCV's have your photo affixed to map of USA in many of their rooms plus map of Colombia with Lleras' photo. Our PCV's are hungry for news. We are ^{arranging} ~~getting~~ "Time", "Newsweek", NY Times Sunday edition. Also, we'll soon starting publication

of our own "P.C. World Newsletter" from Washington hqts. Already in existence are P.C. Newsletters within Colombia, the Philippines - i.e. national newsletters.

#6 If Colombia's needs + opportunities are equaled in other South American countries, we'll need 5,000 PCV's in Latin America. Ten days ago the leading Commure in Colombia returned from Moscow accompanied by 280 Colombian students he had taken on 3 months tour of Soviet Russia. Therefore, to make real dent in Colombian situation we should plan on 500 - There are 1,200 small towns (approx 3 to 10,000 ~~3~~ population). We should have PCV's in at least $\frac{1}{2}$ of them. What's more, they should have been there for last 10 years.

#7 - Your Ambassador in Colombia, Tony Freeman - is the most Kennedista, career foreign service man I've met. Speaks fluent French, Spanish, Chinese, + Italian. Works hard - making real effort to get around entire country. Great friend + classmate of Dave Bell. - Very anti. Mc Carthy whose activities caused sacking of Freeman's friends: John Patton Davies, John Service, etc.

#8 Press in Colombia very favorable - Please get translation of enclosed edit from biggest, most influential daily "El Tiempo". Shows how well things going. Also, enclosed "life" article, which never appeared in USA, is great for us down here. Note author: Max Herner.

#9 Please tell Jackie she's the new, pin-up queen of the Latinos. They have

V

dubbed her "La Reina", + her pic appears
on many a wall.

10 If you've gotten this
far, please pass this letter to Eunice.
I hope she joins me in Brazil -

Best,

Sarge

Oct. 27th, 1961

May 30, 1961

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

FOLLOWING IS A LETTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE:

May 30, 1961

Dear Mr. President: (Dear Mr. Speaker)

I have the honor to transmit herewith for the consideration of the Congress a legislative proposal to authorize the establishment of a Peace Corps in fiscal year 1962, as I recommended on March 1, 1961. Enactment of this legislation will provide authority for the recruitment, training, and service overseas of American men and women whose skills and knowledge can contribute in a most valuable and practical way to the achievement of social and economic development goals of developing countries.

Simultaneously with my Special Message to the Congress of March 1, I directed the undertaking of a Peace Corps pilot program to serve as a source of information and experience in formulating plans for a more permanent organization. The Peace Corps has already announced projects to be undertaken in Tanganyika, Columbia, and the Philippines, and others will be announced soon. Progress and planning to date has confirmed that there is a genuine and immediate need in many parts of the world for skilled manpower which the Peace Corps will be able to furnish. Moreover, the governments and peoples of many developing countries have enthusiastically received the idea of a Peace Corps.

Americans as well are responding to this opportunity to serve their country. More than 2,500 Peace Corps Volunteer Questionnaires have been returned, and additional questionnaires are being received at a rate of more than 100 every day.

This legislative proposal requests that Congress authorize \$40 million for this program for the fiscal year 1962. This should enable the Peace Corps to have 500-1000 volunteers abroad by the end of this calendar year, to have approximately 2,700 abroad or in training by June 1962 and to provide for the training during the summer of 1962 of volunteers expected to be enrolled in June and July 1962.

MORE

(OVER)

Under the proposed legislation volunteers will receive a living allowance and subsistence adequate to maintain a modest standard of living overseas. In addition, their health is carefully provided for. In return for service, each volunteer will receive a modest monthly payment which, in most cases, will be accumulated to be paid upon the termination of his duty; .

I have further requested the Secretary of State to establish arrangements to assure that Peace Corps activities are consistent and compatible with country development assistance plans. These arrangements will assure that the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development programs are brought into close relationship, while at the same time preserving the separate identity and unique role of the Peace Corps.

The Peace Corps offers a special and timely opportunity to put dedicated Americans to work for the cause of world peace and human understanding. Therefore, I urge the early consideration and enactment by the Congress of the proposal.

Respectfully yours,

John F. Kennedy

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Bill attached

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE, AUGUST 9, 1962

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO GROUP OF 600 PEACE CORPS
TRAINEES ON THE SOUTH LAWN
OF THE WHITE HOUSE

MR. WIGGINS: Peace Corps Trainees, my name is Warren Wiggins. I am Sargent Shriver's Associate Director for Program Development and Operations and Acting Director. In his absence, it is my pleasure, as Acting Director of the Peace Corps, to say just a brief word of welcome to you and to extend Sargent's own personal disappointment in not being here with you today to share this particular occasion.

As you may have heard or know, Sarg is presently enroute to the Far East to visit the trainees of the foreign -- to visit the volunteers of the four Far Eastern countries, so it is just physically impossible for him to be here today.

We expect the President very shortly. I believe most of the volunteers are here, so there is nothing to do but just wait a couple of minutes until the President arrives.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY: Thank you very much.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are very glad to welcome you here to the White House.

This occasion gives me a particular sense of satisfaction to welcome 600 Americans from all parts of the country who have committed themselves to a great adventure, I think, for our country and more than our country, for really all people.

I think that by the end of this year we will have more than 5,000 Peace Corpsmen, men and women of all ages, serving abroad in all parts of the world, in countries about which most Americans knew little ten years ago, countries which we did not even know existed 20 years ago.

This is an extraordinary action by this country and I know that you are proud to take part in it. I must say that it gives me the greatest satisfaction that it is taking place at this time.

I have been through the list of the various areas to which you are going -- Georgetown University, 307 secondary school teachers for Ethiopia. Perhaps those of you going to Ethiopia could hold up your hands. We have two medical doctors for Ethiopia who were included in that group. There are 11 teachers, nurses, auto mechanics, going to Afganistan. They have gone to Afganistan.

From George Washington University, 76 secondary and college teachers, agricultural extension workers, for Nepal. Would they raise their hands? Very good.

University of Maryland, 48 secondary school teachers and agricultural workers for Turkey, and 36 teachers at all levels for British Honduras. You got them sort of down at that end.

Nineteen secondary school teachers for Ecuador. Twelve secondary school teachers for Venezuela, and at Howard University, 29 rural development workers for Cyprus.

Is that better than going to British Honduras? I don't think it is.

Twenty-two English teachers for Togo. Twenty medical doctors, nurses and technicians for Togo. Nine fishermen for Togo. Seven English teachers for Niger. Six English teachers for Senegal. Nine medical doctors, nurses, technicians for Sierra Leone. Six hundred thirteen.

Well -- I must say I wish that all Americans could hear that litany of countries you are going to, your willingness to do it, and I hope that when you come back that we can persuade you to come and serve in the United States Government in other areas, particularly in the Foreign Service, in all of the areas, because I think the United States is so heavily involved in so many parts of the world, we are so in need of dedicated men and women of talent and experience, that I can think of no better recruiting ground than the Peace Corps for our future Foreign Service Officers, for those who represent our information services and aid agencies abroad, so that I hope that you will regard this as the first instalment in a long life of service in the most exciting career in the most exciting time, and that is serving this country in the 60's and 70's, so we are very proud to have you here.

The White House belongs to all the people, but I think it particularly belongs to you.

END

Dear Gags:—

Aug. 15th 1968

I am 70 years old today, and I think of
where I am & what I'm doing, & why—
When Earl died, my life lost its meaning &
direction - For the first time I lost my
will to live—

Since that time I've tried to make my life
have some significance—

I felt wretched when I was at home; as
housemother for my bel. sweet K.A.:-
And, I'm glad I worked at the Turany
home, but God forgive that I ever had
to live in one—

I didn't dream that in this remote
corner of the world— So far away from
the people & material things that I
always considered so necessary. It shows
what life is really all about.
Sharing yourself with others & accepting
their love for you is the most precious
gift of all.

If I had the world for my children, it

It would be that each of you would
have to do the thing & reach for
goals in your own ~~life~~ lines that
have meaning for you as individuals,
doing as much as you can for
everybody, but not worrying if you
don't please everyone.

When I look over my life, I see the
pieces fit - it has been a planned life
& I truly believe God has everything
to do with it. - I hope -

M



Box 1096
Peace Corps
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia
April 1, 1963

Mr. Robert F. Kennedy
Attorney General of the United States
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I am fully aware of the demands on your time, but I want to discuss briefly a matter of great importance to me - my future in politics. Please bear with me.

After graduating from Dartmouth (lettering in swimming) in 1962 with a major in government, I joined the Peace Corps and am presently reaping the fruits of that decision. When my assignment here ends I will enter, at 23, either Yale or Harvard Law School, having been accepted by the former and ultimately rejected by the latter last spring.

My home is in Lowell, Massachusetts where my family has resided and conducted business for many years, so our name is known locally. After law school I plan to return to Lowell and run for the City Council, which could in time be a springboard to U.S. Representative assuming that as councilor I was able to demonstrate unusual initiative and political savoir faire.

I feel confident that I have the raw material to be a successful public servant but I am woefully lacking in political experience. Therefore my request lies in search of that experience. I would be very appreciative if you would enlist me as a party worker in some capacity which would enable me to view the inner workings of politics, be it in the presidential election of 1964, any election which you may subsequently enter, or anything which you feel would be instructive.

I will return to the States in July of 1964 and will be anxious to be baptized politically if you can help me.

In hopes that I may hear from you, I am

Respectfully yours,

Paul E. Tsongas

Paul E. Tsongas

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#17B.1	4/ 2/63	JFK, Sargent Shriver.	2pp.

FOREWORD

TRANSCRIPT WARNING. All written transcripts are imperfect abstracts of spoken conversation. Variations in sound quality and in the aural acuity of listeners can and do produce wide variations in what is heard. Even though transcripts may be prepared at great effort and with great care, many points of ambiguity are inevitable, and erroneous interpretations from transcripts are always possible. Therefore, to ensure full confidence in any and all quotations from the presidential recordings, users are strongly urged to check all transcript renditions against the actual tape recordings before publication.

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PUNCTUATION. The following conventions are used throughout the transcripts:

* * * To indicate a pause in the recording while the speaker listens to the person speaking at the other end of the telephone. Used when only one side of a telephone conversation is recorded.

[?] When the transcriber is not certain of what is said on the recording.

. . . . To indicate a sentence which the speaker trails off without completing it.

. . . When a speaker is interrupted before a sentence is completed.

_____ To indicate the speaker's emphasis.

[] Used to enclose editorial comments of the transcriber such as [Meeting appears to be breaking up.] or [Several speakers speak at once and none of the words are intelligible.]

NAMES. The first time a name is mentioned, the full name is provided whenever it is known. "JFK" and "RFK" are used for President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, respectively. When the identity of a speaker is unknown, "Speaker?" is used; when the identification of a speaker is uncertain, a question mark follows the name. The Tables of Contents list only the participants who have been at least tentatively identified as speakers. The heading of each transcript gives the names of all participants listed in the President's Appointment Books as scheduled to attend the meeting.

PAPERS OF JOHN F. KENNEDY
PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FILES

Presidential Recordings

Transcript

This transcript is from Dictabelt 17A.4.

There are 1 pages of transcript representing 1
minutes of recorded conversation. See transcript heading
for further information.

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AUDIO RECORDINGS BEFORE PUBLICATION

Belt 17A

Item 17A.4

April 2, 1963¹

JFK: Hello.

Shriver:² Hello, Jack?

JFK: Yeah, Sarge.

Shriver: Hi, how are you?

JFK: Good. Fine. Fine.

Shriver: I'm sorry to bother you . . .

JFK: Not a bit.

Shriver: . . . but I'm getting rather suspicious over here that, uh, despite your instructions that, uh, some of our friends over in the Central Intelligence Agency might think that they're smarter than anybody else and that they are trying to stick fellows into the Peace Corps.

JFK: Yeah. Yeah.

Shriver: And, John McCone has told me on two or three occasions, and Dulles³ of course did, that they never would do that.

JFK: Right. Right.

Shriver: They sent out messages and the rest of it.

JFK: Right.

Shriver: But, uh, we've got a group in training now that looks suspicious, and I'd like, uh, . . .

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1. Date is as given on material received, but it is not confirmed.
 2. R. Sargent Shriver.
 3. Allen W. Dulles.
 4. Dictabelt 17A ends. Last part of conversation is repeated on the beginning of Dictabelt 17B, item 1, and continues on that belt.

PAPERS OF JOHN F. KENNEDY
PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FILES

Presidential Recordings

Transcript

This transcript is from Dictabelt 17B.1.

There are 2 pages of transcript representing 1
minutes of recorded conversation. See transcript heading
for further information.

READERS ARE CAUTIONED TO CHECK ALL QUOTATIONS AGAINST
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Belt 17B

Item 17B.1

April 2, 1963¹

[Repeats end of item 17A.4 and continues.]

Shriver:² . . . fellows into the Peace Corps.

JFK: Yeah. Yeah.

Shriver: And, John McCone has told me on two or three occasions, and Dulles³ of course did, that they never would do that.

JFK: Right. Right.

Shriver: They sent out messages and the rest of it.

JFK: Right.

Shriver: But, uh, we've got a group in training now that looks suspicious, and I'd like, uh, to follow whatever you recommend, but I sure in hell want those guys, uh, . . .

JFK: Well, would you call Dick Helms?⁴

Shriver: Dick Helms?

JFK: Yeah. He's the operations officer over there under . . . And just say to him that you've talked to me and that I don't want anybody in there.

Shriver: Okay.

JFK: And if they are there, let's get them out now before we have it. And if there is any problem about it that Dick Helms ought to call the President about it. That . . .

Shriver: Okay.

JFK: . . . this is very . . . We are very, very anxious that there be no, uh, we don't want to discredit this whole idea.

Shriver: Okay. Fine.

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1. Date is as given on material received, but it is not confirmed.
 2. R. Sargent Shriver.
 3. Allen W. Dulles.
 4. Richard Helms.

JFK: And, uh, they . . . Christ, they're not gonna find out that much intelligence!

Shriver: That's right.

JFK: Now, the other thing is, I notice with these people coming back, can we do anything about seeing if we can get some of them to go into the Foreign Service?

Shriver: Yes. The Foreign Service has already changed their, uh, examination schedules, and the kind of exams they give, and the, uh, places that they are going to be given, uh, and done everything that they can this year to facilitate Peace Corps guys getting into the Foreign Service, and . . .

JFK: Yeah.

Shriver: . . . USIA⁵ has done the same thing, and AID⁶ is trying to do something.

JFK: Yeah. Yeah.

Shriver: Uh, I think we'll have to find out by one trial run to see whether it's successful.

JFK: Okay. Well, I just wanted to be sure. Uh, let me know if there's anything we can do, but these are the guys I'd like to get into the Foreign Service.

Shriver: Okay. Fine.

JFK: Okay.

Shriver: Thanks.

JFK: 'bye, Sarge.

5. United States Information Agency.

6. Agency for International Development.

July 6, 1964:

1.

This is the first entry in a journal of my Peace Corps experiences, which I hope will be both informative and interesting.

To bring incidents up to date, let me briefly describe what has happened so far. Late last summer I applied as a volunteer for the United States Peace Corps. From that minute on, I have continually brooded and hoped for my selection. After three months, I received information which instructed me to take the Peace Corps examination. This I did in late January - right in the middle of my school exam period. This 5½ hour exam was as complete a test as I had ever taken. Since these vast comprehensive tests are rarely indicative of one's "intellectual prowess", it seems that the Peace Corps places the correct emphasis - as I gather, really not much. This exam covered all that the books said it would - and then some. As I remember now, the questions on US history and poetry strike me as incredibly minute. Enough on the exam.

Following this exam, I had the understanding that I would hear of my selection or rejection within two to three months. I was grossly mistaken. I remember every day thereafter I greeted the mail hoping to hear something. But I didn't. Finally as graduation drew near I wrote requesting knowledge as to my status. More than a month later, I received a form post-card saying nothing new. With Daddy and Mother living in London, I became wary of exactly what I was going to do. I finally called the Reverend William Sloane Coffin, the Chaplain at Yale, whom I knew from my Andover days. He suggested that I call Mr. Samuel Babbitt in Washington. This I did. Mr. Babbitt commended me on my patience and said he would call me back. He called the next day and told me that I would hear within the next two weeks. In these two weeks, while shuffling back and forth inbetween New Haven, New York, and Westport, I heard nothing. I then began to get desperate and called again. Mr. Babbitt returned my call the next day and said that I would hear that afternoon. About ½ hour later he called back and told me that I was selected for a Peace Corps Project in the Dominican Republic. My relief and happiness was really indescribable - as Mait could easily attest to. At least then I knew what I was going to be doing. My thoughts and plans for the Navy CCS were discontinued with no great sorrow.

Shortly thereafter on June 27, 1963 I received the first batch of forms - acceptance, Selection Service, medical, and Civil Service. These have all been completed and sent in and I am, at this point, awaiting further information. My training is to begin on August 1, but I don't know where.

I must say a word here about my physical exam, which I took at the VA regional Hospital at 252 Seventh Avenue. What Quacks!! Those doctors really didn't know nuthin' from nuthin'. The eye doctor and medical doctor were particularly "interesting". How does it take over ½ hour for forms to go from the sixth to the seventh floor. Really tremendous inefficiency.

I might at this point record some of my views on the Peace Corps and why I applied. First, this seems like an opportunity that seems hard to pass up. I think it will do me a tremendous amount of good personally. Second, I honestly feel that I can do some good for people who are struggling to better themselves and only through birth have not had all the opportunities that I have had. The Peace Corps is not going to solve the problems of the world tomorrow, but in the long range, I feel

it will definitely bring about a better world. If other countries can succeed with their proposed Peace Corps programs of their own, I can foresee no better method through which a conceivable world order and understanding can be achieved.

As to myself, I am very skeptical as to my capabilities in such a Peace Corps position. My only hope is that, if I do get to the Dominican Republic, I can do a good job and help the people in some way. The training has me "psyched up". I've read all I can about it, and it really scares me. I hope that I will get through it. If there was anything in which I want to succeed, it is the Peace Corps. I can not remember any stronger desire for success in something that I want, than I have now for the Peace Corps. I hope that the Peace Corps, though, can work through the incredibly confusing addresses in my "Background Information" form.

I also want to record some thanks to many people. First and foremost to Mother and Daddy I extend my my most sincere appreciation, thanks and love. They have given me so much and I have returned so little. How I can repay them, I will never really know. Special thanks for their invaluable guidance and tolerance that enabled me to reach this point. To Mait also, my deepest appreciation and love. I hope things work out well for him in the next few weeks with moving, the draft and Bullvaline. He has been so kind and thoughtful in these last few weeks and months when I was neither coming nor going. For this and unaccountable other things - thanks. And also to Carl and Martha I extend my indebtedness for giving me their house in this summer. I hope to find a way to repay them for everything. Maybe I'll be able to do something for their children in return. This discussion is really lacking in exactness, but it is impossible to put into words my gratitude and love that I would like to express to my family. If they ever read this - my sincerest thanks, as inadequate as that certainly is.

That is the situation up to now. All I can do is wait and hope that I can live up to my desires, and those of my family - and those of the Peace Corps.

July 18, 1963:

Last week I received some more information from the Peace Corps. This was the form for the special passport that I need.

I am getting extremely restless after almost two months of sitting on my ass. I am really looking forward to August 1, and expect to hear any day when, where, and how I am to go to my training site. I certainly hope that I will train in the West or in Puerto Rico. My guess at this point is that I will go to Puerto Rico.

I must repeat how grateful I am to Mait and Susan and to Carl and Martha. I feel so guilty at taking all their favors, not knowing how

I will or can repay them. I just do not like taking from people being unable to return the favors. If it were not for them, God knows how I would have made it through these few months. Again my sincerest thanks.

Everything so far seems to be in order, except for my buying a movie camera and my picking up my junk that John Shively has in Goshen, New York. Oh well!

It is worrisome, though, whether the Peace Corps will be able to figure out my Background Information Forms. Everything is so mixed up, I hope it works out. I am determined to be a success in my training if it kills me. If I get through that OK, I hope I am able to do a good job in the Dominican Republic.

My only wish at this point is that I would like to see my parents before I go for these two years. I miss them and would like to see them again. I am just now realizing how alone I really am. Not that I really mind it, but it is such a different state from that I have been used to for the past twenty-one years.

I am rambling now, so will stop. Off to Bonnie's wedding tomorrow.

July 23, 1963:

On July 19, I received my training instructions. I am very pleased both about going to Puerto Rico and about Los Angeles. I can not fully understand why I am going to Puerto Rico first, but I guess I will soon. Am in the midst now of trying to buy a movie camera - knowing nothing, I'll probably chose the wrong one.

Have just finished buying \$29.99 worth of clothes for training. Hope they are OK. Am confused as to whether to supply myself with LA stuff too.

As per the efficient government, I received a plane ticket from New Haven to New York City. Don't plan to use it, but it struck me as amusing

August 1, 1963:

Am in the middle of my second day as a registered Peace Corps Trainee. I arrived in New York at about 10:30 AM from Westport. At the Hotel Wellington am rooming with two other guys, one of which is in the other Dominican Republic group - teacher training. Have filled out other forms and almost had trouble with my medical forms, but luckily they came the afternoon that I was supposed to see the medical officials. Went out to Greenwich Village last night with thirteen others - most of whom are going to Panama. Have my first orientation meeting tonight. Also have found out that my group will be the first to train at LA, which should be interesting. My project as I understand it will be

Community Development - beginning with recreation for children and then extending to the adults. This sounds like an extremely worthwhile project and am looking forward to it. Needless to say, I am anxious to get to Puerto Rico.

The other PC people all seem quite nice. It strikes me as one of the significant aspects of the Peace Corps, that here are young people from Oregon, Texas, New Mexico, Tennessee, Florida, etc., all gathering together to try to better the world in some small way. This, to me, refutes many cynics who say America is going to Pot. From a selfish point of view, this is certainly a great experience and opportunity for any and every person. I feel lucky that I am in a position to benefit from the Peace Corps, as I hope to be beneficial to others.

August 5, 1963:

Have just finished my first meeting at Camp Crozier. After five rather boring days at the Hotel Wellington in New York, we finally packed up this morning at 5:45 AM to go to Idewilde. At 9:15 AM we flew, via "Trans Caribbean", to San Juan. There we had a 1/2 hour briefing from the DVS Representative in Puerto Rico. We took buses to Camp Crozier, passing along the north coast to Arecibo, and then to about three miles from camp. There we rode vans to the camp, passing through breath-taking scenery of mountains and valleys. It was indescribable.

Arriving at Camp Crozier I was immediately struck by the similarity to Chewonki - each suited to its own purpose. I am in Cabin #11 - luckily screened in and with plastic clothes bags. My suitcase broke as I arrived, but I think I'll be able to fix the zipper.

This evening had an orientation meeting, conducted by the specific instructors. Jorge, the camp manager, was hilarious in his speech. I hope to talk to him more. I will describe each activity as I participate, but many of my fears concerning the "zip cord" and the dam are greatly lessened. Now I am really confident that I will do OK.

We are learning Spanish via instructors from the Berlitz School. This is the first cycle to do this and should be good. Am looking forward to Spanish as I am also very much to everything else.

I have met in the pastweek some terribly nice people. Particularly impressing are the DVS people, training instructors, and others who show their complete dedication to their work and to the Peace Corps. This is such a fantastic program with superbly chosen administrators. I hope I am not disqualified because of means beyond my control - i.e. medical, security, etc. Perhaps I am including too many of my thoughts in this journal, but nevertheless think them worthwhile noting.

Tomorrow I begin my first training as outlined in the schedule.

August 7, 1963:

Yesterday had my first taste of everything. Had a Spanish test from the Berlitz School; then learned the first fundamentals of drown-proofing; had orientation on rock climbing - many of my fears have been satisfied, and am sure everything will be OK; and went on a three mile, two hour trek - learning about snails, plants, fruits, etc. Also had a briefing on the diseases in the DR.

Today just had a three hour session of Spanish. Was a lot of fun and have learned a lot already - parts of body, numbers 1-40, colors.

August 8, 1963:

Not a terribly interesting day today. Began with swimming at 8:00AM - drown-proofing with feet tied for 10 minutes, swimming 4 lengths, front and back somersault, and tried to swim one width under water but only made one-half. I stayed in for 35 minutes, so passed the test. Then had work detail, which consisted of picking up wood and trash and burning it. In the afternoon had Spanish all the time, learning some verbs and more prepositions. We are going to have 28 lessons from the Berlitz people. Tomorrow go to the rocks and trek for the first time and am looking forward to it. Haven't taken any pictures yet, as have no slide film. But will take some movies on the rocks.

August 10, 1963:

Yesterday, first went on my survival trek, and with Joe Dandrea and Charles ? built a lean-to, a fire, and cooked malanga - a meaty potato-like artichoke heart, boiled bananas, bread fruit, and jave. Not too bad and learned quite a bit. In the afternoon went rock climbing. First, climbed a 40-50 foot rock cliff, really not too bad. Then I belayed and it was amazing how strong that the position is and secure you feel when you fall. After that I rappelled down in a sling and a safety rope. I was quite nervous, not really scared. Did that three times. Also climbed the "Friction Pitch" using foot-holds and flat hands. It was fun and was suprised how unscared I was, but nervous. Ben Elkus does a lot to ease everything. Yesterday night had more Spanish and a talk from two Volunteers currently in the DR.

Today, had more Spanish in the morning. Began swimming my 1 3/4 hours, but only got to 30 minutes as a thunderstorm came. But was able to have Recreation Skills, in which everyone presented their own games. Tonight our first Fiesta. Tomorrow plan to go to Ponce on my free day.

August 18, 1963:

Am writing this entry after much activity. Last Monday, August 12, was normal with swimming, work, and Spanish. On Tuesday, I had my first climbing. This was a fantastic experience. I began with the first climb, "2 Piton". This was tough and I was a little nervous and probably tried too hard. But I made it and then belayed. In order to get down I had to rappel. To be completely honest, I was as scared as I had ever been in my life. I have a natural fear of heights and I was just plain petrified. It was that first step over a ledge ninety to one-hundred feet above the ground. Once I was over, it was OK - and really fun. I then climbed the second climb, "Phillipines". This was really no problem for some reason. The second rappel was also OK - really a tremendous experience. Perhaps I now have some realization of the value of this training.

In the afternoon of August 13 I had my nap trek with no difficulty. All we had to do was to follow the map. We had an easy trek as we had to be back that night.

I will leave my account of my four-day trek until tomorrow.

August 19, 1963:

Today I just took some more Spanish and went to the ocean to swim about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile. Not really hard and I don't think it really proved anything.

I now want to begin the account of the 4 day trek. On Wednesday morning, August 14, the four of us - Doug Brown, Bill Emerson, Joe Deslaurier, and I - boarded a van and headed for El Lago de Guineo. Ben Elkus drove us and let us off not at Divisano but on top of the hill at the Mision Noel. We then walked across the dam of El Lago de Guineo and immediately hit our trail - up! We climbed for most of the morning, reaching the top of 3916 feet - straight up. The views were unbelievable and we could easily see the South Coast of the Island. On our way down we ate wild strawberries and fallen bananas. We got incredibly lost in a banana jungle and I had to hack our way through the nettles with the machete. We crossed a river and headed for Saliente, our community. I had never been so dirty and sweaty, but little did I know what dirty really was.

We arrived in Saliente about 4:00 PM on Wednesday and immediately headed for the Tienda for beer and to cut our cheese. We tried to think of a way to find food and room. We sat around and were stared at continuously. Finally Joe began to play with the kids. We finally decided we needed to find a place to stay. We wandered up and down into the heavily populated hill. Doug approached two houses at no avail. We asked the Tienda owner if we could camp in the field behind his house. He said that he would put us up and feed us. Senor Gonzales had nine kids and a wife, but still was more than willing to feed us. We gave him our beans and he added spaghetti and beer from his Tienda.